Inside the Orbán Government’s Space War

(Magyar) Illusztráció: Török Virág / Telex

In early fall 2023, a meeting was held on a particularly sensitive topic in the office of then-Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, located in the Carmelite Monastery in the Buda castle.

The meeting addressed issues related to the country’s defense capabilities. In addition to the prime minister, those present included Antal Rogán, head of the Prime Minister’s Office; Sándor Pintér, Minister of the Interior; Kristóf Szalay-Bobrovniczky, Minister of Defense; Gábor Böröndi, Chief of the General Staff; and Levente Magyar, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Orsolya Ferencz, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Ministerial Commissioner for Space Research, was also invited to the meeting. The Fidesz politician then outlined the satellite construction project that had been developed in recent years through collaboration among several government agencies and ministries.

In her presentation, Ferencz noted that, due to the rapid development of telecommunications and mass media technology, it will be of crucial importance in the future for countries to have their own assets in space. She argued that Hungary, too, needs a satellite system capable of performing both communications and military tasks.

Ferencz explained that, for national security reasons, this satellite program should be managed by the Hungarian government, and the cost would be approximately 250 billion forints (685 million euros). He also added that while the necessary space hardware would be manufactured by large international corporations, smaller Hungarian space industry companies and members of the Hungarian scientific community could benefit from the process.

According to sources familiar with the details of the discussion, it was then that Orbán first realized the strategic significance of a Hungarian satellite system, which could be used to monitor events similar to the 2015 migrant crisis or developments on the battlefield during the Russia-Ukraine war. Orbán thanked Ferencz, who had given the presentation, for bringing all of this to his attention. Among the other participants, Rogán was the only one who made a meaningful comment, detailing how costs could be saved on the satellite system under development.

Although it seemed that Ferencz’s presentation had won Orbán’s approval, an unexpected turn of events occurred in the following weeks. According to sources familiar with the events, the prime minister decided to entrust the construction of the satellite system—which is of paramount importance from a national security perspective—not to the state, but to 4iG, a company that is privately owned on paper but is in fact linked to the Fidesz government in numerous ways.

Although this arrangement would have shifted part of the development costs to 4iG, the company did not actually take on excessive risk with this deal. This is because the government had already committed in advance to purchasing the subsequent, expensive satellite services.

With this decision, 4iG assumed a much larger role than had been envisioned by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (KKM), which had been working on the concept, or by the Ministry of Defense (HM), which was also involved due to defense considerations. Representatives of the two ministries objected to the government entrusting the construction of this critical infrastructure to a company that lacks the necessary national security clearance and whose ownership structure is opaque due to its network of private equity funds. They believed these issues would make it difficult for the Hungarian satellite program to integrate into NATO’s defense system.

The prime minister, however, brushed aside these criticisms. Shortly after the meeting at Karmelita, starting in January 2024, oversight of space industry developments was transferred from the Ministry of Defense (KKM) to the Ministry of National Economy (NGM), led by Márton Nagy, who was more receptive to 4iG. Subsequently, 4iG began negotiations with this ministry, among others, to determine how much the state would pay 4iG in exchange for various satellite services.

This was yet another example of how the Orbán government used various governmental tools to help 4iG—which was on its way to becoming one of Hungary’s largest companies—seize a new opportunity.

With this project, the company gained a foothold in the space and defense sectors, which became increasingly important in 4iG’s operations in the period that followed.

However, plans for satellite construction may be thwarted by the fact that Fidesz suffered a historic defeat in the April election, forcing Orbán out of power after 16 years. The Tisza administration has begun reviewing the activities of the previous political leadership, including the government agreements signed with 4iG. Only then will it become clear how the relationship between 4iG and the new government will develop, and what the fate of the satellite project will be. Government sources told Direkt36 that investigations so far already suggest that Orbán’s administration struck a deal with 4iG on the satellite project that was unfavorable to the Hungarian state.

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In response to the criticism, 4iG told Direkt36 that the Hungarian government incurs no investment costs by entrusting the construction of the satellite system to a private company. Thus, the company said, once the entire infrastructure is up and running, the state will only have to pay for the services provided by the satellite system. They added that if 4iG fails to deliver, the international financial institution providing the bank guarantee will repay the Hungarian state’s money, including interest.

Bertalan Havasi, Fidesz’s press secretary, wrote in response to our questions that the Orbán government’s decisions “are documented and traceable in this matter as well,” and therefore suggested that we contact the current government. The Tisza government is currently reviewing the documents mentioned by Havasi; this process could take several more weeks.

Ferencz wrote to Direkt36 that it would be important for Hungary to “possess sovereign satellite capabilities kept under strict state control.” She added that in achieving this, “we must take into account our country’s alliances” and strive to ensure that players in the Hungarian space sector can participate in “industrial and operational tasks.”

I. Big money, influential players

Ferencz Orsolya a korábbi miniszterelnök mellett – Fotó: Fidesz / Facebook

Orsolya Ferencz next to Viktor Orbán – Photo: Fidesz / Facebook

“I would very much like it to happen as soon as possible,” Orsolya Ferencz replied in March 2019 in the Hír TV studio when asked when Hungary might have its own satellite. The reasoning behind Ferencz’s statement was that by that time, the government, in collaboration with professional workshops, was already well underway with the satellite program.

The Fidesz politician—who is both an electrical engineer and a space researcher—was appointed by Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó as the ministerial commissioner responsible for space research back in October 2018. Ferencz then began developing the national space strategy with his team at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (KKM). A key part of the strategy was sending another Hungarian astronaut into space—which came to fruition in the summer of 2025 with Tibor Kapu—as well as launching an independent satellite program.

Shortly after discussions began regarding the state-funded satellite development project—expected to cost billions—several business circles with close ties to the government appeared around the project.

Among them was István Sárhegyi, whose family had strong ties to Fidesz. His father, Zoltán Sárhegyi, a lawyer, served as a Fidesz delegate on the National Election Commission. His mother, Beatrix Bártfai, a lawyer, was involved in the founding of Árpád Habony’s media companies. The family’s law firm—Sárhegyi & Associates—received contracts worth hundreds of millions from various government agencies and ministries during the Orbán administration.

István Sárhegyi himself also cultivated such connections, for example with the former prime minister’s son, Gáspár Orbán. Both were key members of the student organization known as the Law Students’ Self-Education Organization (JÖSZ), which was designated as a specialized college in 2019. According to an article by Átlátszó, Orbán was one of the founders of JÖSZ, while Sárhegyi served as its director.

After his college years, Sárhegyi turned his attention to the space industry and space law—a field less well-known in Hungary—after completing a course at the International Space University in Ireland in 2017.

“That’s where I got hooked on the sector,”

Sárhegyi told Direkt36, adding that it was then that he realized that as spaceflight became more affordable, significant opportunities were opening up even for profit-driven private companies.

Several people took notice of Sárhegyi’s activities. “You could tell he wanted a playground of his own where he could be in charge. And the space industry seemed like just that,” said a source familiar with the Hungarian space sector.

Thanks to his ambitions and network of contacts, Sárhegyi quickly made his presence felt in the satellite project’s orbit. He said that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (KKM) hired him as a legal advisor in 2018, which is how he came to work with Orsolya Ferencz, who was working on the space strategy at the time. Although his parents’ law firm also did work for the KKM, Sárhegyi claimed that his success in the space sector was due to his own professional work and had nothing to do with his parents’ contract.

The other business circle was 4iG, led by Gellért Jászai, which was expanding at a breakneck pace at the time and became one of the country’s largest companies in just a few years. Starting in 2018, it became a major player in the IT sector, and after 2020, it began expanding into the telecommunications market. In this process, in addition to state subsidies and assistance from regulatory authorities, Orbán’s special attention also played a key role. Direkt36 previously revealed that there were instances when the prime minister personally negotiated one of 4iG’s telecommunications-related deals, which was, in theory, a private matter.

Soon, the business circles of Jászai and Sárhegyi merged. In August 2020, CarpathiaSat Zrt. was founded with the goal of launching and operating Hungary’s first satellite into Earth orbit. The Hungarian government established this company jointly with 4iG and one of Sárhegyi’s companies (New Space Industries Zrt.).

II. Military and civilian objectives

Sárhegyi István (balról második) beszállt az üzletbe – Fotó: 4iG

István (second from the left) joined the business – Photo: 4iG

Influential business figures had thus emerged around the satellite program, but at that point it still appeared that government agencies would essentially control the project. At the time, they were focused on technical issues, such as what kind of technical capabilities the country’s satellite would need.

The project was coordinated by a team from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs led by Orsolya Ferencz. “For example, they also incorporated the needs of the Ministry of Defense,” said a source familiar with the project, noting that military considerations were taken into account during the planning process. In addition to the Ministry of Defense, the National Media and Infocommunications Authority (NMHH) was also involved in the work. The NMHH was needed, among other reasons, because this authority would be responsible for conducting international negotiations regarding the satellite’s orbital position.

This is how the concept of a dual-use Hungarian satellite system took shape. This meant that, in addition to civilian uses—such as broadcasting and communications—the satellite was also intended for military purposes. In doing so, Hungary would have cooperated with its NATO partners, meaning the satellite would have contributed to the development of defense capabilities within NATO.

Brigadier General Imre Porkoláb, who had worked closely with NATO during his career, played a significant role in formulating these objectives. He was the first Hungarian soldier to graduate from the Royal Military Academy in the United Kingdom, where Gáspár Orbán later studied as well. During his military career, he served in Iraq and Afghanistan, and later worked as a NATO representative at the U.S. Department of Defense, the Pentagon. Starting in 2022, Porkoláb served as the ministerial commissioner responsible for defense innovation within the Ministry of Defense. (Porkoláb confirmed to Direkt36 that he did indeed participate in the technical coordination of the satellite program on behalf of the Ministry of Defense.)

The government envisioned not a single satellite but a system consisting of multiple satellites. According to the plans, the core of the system would be a larger satellite orbiting in what is known as a geostationary orbit. Only a limited number of satellites can occupy this specific orbit, which is in sync with the Earth, so that when viewed from the Earth’s surface, it always appears at the same point in the sky—that is, it continuously covers a fixed area. This large satellite would be assisted by smaller satellites in lower orbits that are linked to it and orbit faster relative to the Earth.

Since the Hungarian government had no experience with building or operating satellites, the concept’s developers also considered whom to entrust with carrying out the project. This led to the idea of acquiring SpaceCom, an Israeli satellite operator. In June 2021, 4iG announced that, together with the partially state-owned CarpathiaSat, it would acquire a majority stake in the Israeli company.

This seemed logical, as the Hungarian government already had a relationship with SpaceCom. Back in the 1980s, the United Nations telecommunications agency allocated to Hungary a specific orbital slot in space where it could operate its own satellite. Since the country had neither the funds nor the technology for this at the time, the Hungarian government leased the orbital slot to SpaceCom in 2004. The company subsequently began operating its satellite, named AMOS 3, on that frequency band.

“That way, we would have acquired the necessary knowledge and capabilities,” said a source familiar with the concept, explaining what was behind the attempted acquisition. However, the acquisition of SpaceCom ultimately fell through. For national security reasons, the Israeli government did not approve a foreign investor acquiring a controlling stake in the satellite company, which also serves the Israeli military.

“In the end, we only managed to buy 20 percent of SpaceCom, which is good for nothing, but we spent a fortune on it,”

the source said of the failed attempt.

At the same time, government agencies working on the concept were also considering who should manufacture the necessary satellites. According to sources familiar with the matter, the names of leading global players such as the European company Airbus and Thales came up during these discussions. The vision for the manufacturing process was that both the Hungarian scientific community and domestic companies would benefit from it. “Just as the car factories here have Hungarian suppliers,” said one source, explaining how smaller domestic companies could be involved in the project.

This was the concept that Orsolya Ferencz presented to Viktor Orbán in the fall of 2023. The prime minister, however, had entirely different ideas.

III. Orbán steps in

Remred’s factory in Martonvásár – Photo: András Szabó

By early 2024, it had become clear to the foreign affairs team working on the satellite program that control had slipped from their hands. In January of that year, the Orbán government decided to transfer oversight of space industry developments from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (KKM) to the Ministry of National Economy, led by Márton Nagy (NGM).

This opened up even more opportunities for 4iG.

“The goal was to have a ministry oversee the sector that would carry out 4iG’s requests,” said a source familiar with the situation. This would not have been the case if the project had remained with Ferencz, as she opposed handing over the satellite investment to private hands. (Ferencz stated that oversight of space industry developments was transferred from her to the NGM despite the fact that the Ministry of National Economy lacked the necessary technical expertise.)

Since Ferencz repeatedly raised his technical and national security concerns regarding 4iG’s role with government leaders—according to sources familiar with the matter—the politician gradually became isolated. (Although it was suggested in November 2023 that she might be Fidesz’s candidate for mayor of Budapest, this ultimately did not happen. Despite Tibor Kapu’s spaceflight being a success story, Ferencz appeared only in 162nd place on the Fidesz list for the 2026 parliamentary election.)

After the sector was transferred to the Ministry of National Economy (NGM), 4iG also stepped up its activities. A few weeks later, in February 2024, they announced the creation of a new subsidiary, 4iG S&T (4iG Space and Technology Zrt.), which would consolidate the group’s space industry and satellite development efforts. At the same time, they announced that István Sárhegyi would be appointed to lead the new company.

By this time, an even closer partnership had developed between 4iG—led by Jászai, who saw opportunities in the space industry—and Sárhegyi.

“The company Remred was the key to bringing them together,”

said a source familiar with the Hungarian space industry. Remred was, in fact, intended to play a pivotal role in the ambitious space industry plans.

Remred originally belonged to the state-owned Energy Research Center (EK). The company’s significance stemmed from the fact that it held the manufacturing rights to the Pille radiation detector. The Pille was one of the most successful inventions in Hungarian space research, and it was even taken into space by Bertalan Farkas, the first Hungarian astronaut, in 1980. The device is still in use today on the International Space Station.

Sárhegyi also recognized the value inherent in Remred and acquired the company in 2021. In 2022, he also announced that he would establish a satellite manufacturing plant at Remred’s base in Martonvásár, Fejér County. At that time, he stated that the plant would manufacture small satellites weighing between 100 and 400 kilograms, along with the systems to operate them.

In the meantime, Jászai also took notice of Remred. Since 4iG lacked significant experience in space technology, the company owned by Sárhegyi was a perfect fit for them. In February 2024—along with the establishment of its space industry subsidiary—4iG announced that, through a capital increase, it would acquire a 45 percent stake in Remred and would also support the satellite manufacturing plans in Martonvásár. Building on this, 4iG began emphasizing that, through Remred, it had gained access to significant aerospace engineering expertise and an international network of contacts.

Following these developments, the 4iG team led by Jászai and Sárhegyi set out, among other things, to negotiate with the Ministry of National Economy regarding what services the satellite system they planned to build would provide to the Hungarian government in the future.

According to a source familiar with the operations of the Tisza government, the Ministry of National Economy (NGM) signed three contracts with 4iG for telecommunications and Earth observation services. The first contract was signed back in 2024. The two additional contracts supplementing this one were signed shortly before the parliamentary elections in April of this year. The total value of the contracts is 2.36 billion euros (approximately 850 billion forints). The Hungarian government has committed to paying this amount over the next decade and a half in exchange for 4iG’s satellite services. (Telex previously reported on these figures in a detailed article. )

According to the source, the current government considers the contracts to be favorable to 4iG. It is difficult to terminate them, but if the government were to attempt to do so unilaterally, the source says it would have to pay the entire fee to 4iG in a lump sum. Furthermore, under the terms of the contracts, the state is required to make payments even during the preparatory phase of the satellite project. In 2025, for example, the Hungarian government paid 4iG an advance of 125.188 million euros (approximately 49 billion forints). (4iG stated that it bears the full risk of the project and that, in its view, the advance payment is lower than the market standard. It added that the government would only be required to pay the remaining full amount if the contract were terminated without legal grounds.)

According to a source familiar with the current government’s operations, other parts of the contracts also raise questions. This is because 4iG has committed to providing services to the government until the satellite system is completed. It plans to do so by purchasing the necessary data from a third party. According to the source, it is unclear why this is beneficial to the government, since the Hungarian government could contract directly with this third party—likely at a lower cost—without going through 4iG. (4iG stated that this obligation to the Hungarian government stems not from the satellite program but from a separate agreement.)

After 4iG signed a contract with the Hungarian government, it began building its system, dubbed HUSAT (Hungarian Satellite). In April of this year, before the parliamentary elections, it reached an agreement with the American company Northrop Grumman to manufacture the larger satellite. The smaller satellites, meanwhile, are scheduled to be manufactured at the Martonvásár plant. Construction of this facility began in the spring of 2024; the project is set to be completed this December, after which trial operations can begin.

Domestic space industry players and participants in the state satellite project have reacted to these plans with skepticism. “Just because someone knows how to fold a paper boat doesn’t mean they’ll be able to build a submarine,” said one source, who believes that Remred—which is capable of manufacturing radiation detectors—lacks the necessary experience to produce the far more complex satellites.

In response, Sárhegyi told Direkt36 that manufacturing and development tasks are carried out jointly with their international partners to minimize technological risks. At the same time, they are also developing their own technology. Thus, the satellites manufactured at the Martonvásár plant will incorporate both in-house and international technologies, he added.

The satellite system has not yet been completed. Plans regarding this are greatly influenced by the fact that Tisza’s election victory has created a new situation for 4iG. The new government announced in August that it would review the contracts between the Hungarian state and 4iG, including agreements related to satellite development. A decision on further cooperation with 4iG will be made thereafter.

For obtaining company information we used Opten’s services.

Cover image: Virág Török  / Telex

  • András worked eight years as a journalist at Origo, a then prestigious online news site, but also spent several years at Index and vs.hu news outlets. At Direkt36 he covers Russian-Hungarian relations, activities of business circles close to Fidesz, and political decision making processes of the Orbán government. In 2011 he received the Gőbölyös Soma Award dedicated to investigative journalism in Hungary, and in 2010 he won the Quality Journalism Award, both for a series of articles that focused on a corruption case connected to the former Socialist-led government.

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  • András is co-founder, editor and executive director of Direkt36. Previously, he was a senior editor for leading Hungarian news site Origo before it had been transformed into the government’s propaganda outlet. He also worked for the BBC World Service in London and was a reporter at the investigative unit of The Washington Post. He has contributed to several international reporting projects, including The Panama Papers and the Pegasus Project. He plays a leading role in the production of Direkt36’s documentaries, including The Dynasty, the award-winning film on the business empire of Viktor Orbán’s family. He won the Soma Prize, the prestigious annual award dedicated to investigative journalism in Hungary, three times. He was a World Press Institute fellow in 2008, a Humphrey fellow at the University of Maryland in 2012/13, and a Nieman fellow at Harvard University in 2019/20. András has taught journalism courses at Hungarian universities.

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