A Hungarian employee of the European Commission initially saw nothing suspicious about the friendly invitations from V., a charming diplomat at Hungary’s Permanent Representation to the EU in Brussels. They met twice a year—sometimes every three months—usually in parks. But V. wasn’t only interested in EU affairs. The diplomat was also interested in any gossip circulating within the Commission official’s wide network of contacts.

“He was a very likeable, intelligent man. But by then, I already knew he was an intelligence officer operating under diplomatic cover,” the Hungarian EU official told Direkt36, recalling their meetings between 2015 and 2017. By diplomatic cover, the source meant that while V. was officially employed as a foreign ministry diplomat, he was in reality an officer of the Information Office (IH)—Hungary’s foreign intelligence agency.

That was eventually revealed by V. himself. During one meeting, he went beyond small talk and tried to have the Commission employee sign a recruitment paper, which would have made them an officially recruited “secret collaborator” of the IH. Knowing that money wouldn’t be a motivating factor, V. tried another angle—offering to secure funding for an organization close to the official’s heart.

“We can find financing for that,” he promised, adding that the money wouldn’t come directly from the IH. “We’ll sort it out,” he insisted—implying that some other Hungarian state body could issue the payment.

The offer hit the Commission staffer like a cold shower. He politely but firmly refused. “Even if I signed, I couldn’t tell you anything more,” he replied, making it clear that while he was open to continuing to meet with V., he saw no point in formal recruitment.

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Brussels is one Europe’s spy capitals—home not only to the EU, but also NATO and numerous other international organizations. Covert intelligence-gathering there is usually the domain of Russian, Chinese, Iranian, or other Middle Eastern services—not of EU member states spying on an alliance and institutional system to which they themselves belong.

V. and his colleagues’ methods went beyond the limits of what is still considered normal or acceptable in Brussels for an EU member state. Moreover, Hungarian intelligence officers operated recklessly, ignoring basic security precautions. In 2017, V. was exposed—an incident that compromised Hungary’s entire Brussels spy network. As the IH’s rezidentura chief—the head of the network—his fall triggered a domino effect that brought down the entire operation.

“He acted irresponsibly, and that drew the EU’s attention. He tried to recruit people in an astonishingly blatant way. Some EU employees even reported him,” said a source familiar with V.’s exposure.

“It was a serious affair. Practically everyone was burned. The entire network had to be rebuilt from scratch,” recalled a source familiar with the IH’s operations at the time, referring to how Hungarian intelligence had to reestablish its positions in Brussels almost from zero.

This previously unknown chapter in the deteriorating relationship between the Orbán government and EU institutions was pieced together from interviews with more than a dozen insiders familiar with the workings of the Information Office (IH) and Hungary’s Permanent Representation (PR), as well as EU officials whom the IH had tried to recruit.

Since the EU and Belgian authorities became aware of this past operation by the Hungarian intelligence services years ago, the disclosure of these events does not affect the current activities of the IH.

The investigation was conducted in collaboration with the German investigative center Paper Trail Media and the Belgian daily De Tijd. They supplemented the investigation with their own German and Belgian sources and are publishing their findings separately in Der Spiegel (Germany), Der Standard (Austria), and De Tijd (Belgium).

The main targets of the infiltration into EU institutions and the intelligence network’s buildup were Hungarian citizens working in Brussels-based institutions — foreigners were not targeted in this way by the Hungarian intelligence network operating there.

When approaching Hungarians, the Information Office (IH) used various means: money, career advancement opportunities, or appeals to patriotic duty. We have no information on how many times this succeeded—in other words, how many Hungarians working at the EU were recruited.

“Other countries try things like this too. The problem begins when this [espionage against the EU] no longer serves a nation, but a ruling clique—or even a single individual,” said the Hungarian Commission official who had rejected V.’s recruitment attempt. “It’s the underlying motivation that’s really problematic,” the official added—explaining that he felt the IH’s operations in Brussels no longer served Hungary’s national interest, but rather aimed to strengthen the political and economic power of the Orbán government and its associates.

For example, Direkt36 revealed last autumn that in the mid-2010s, the IH had surveilled and wiretapped investigators from the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) during their mission to Hungary. The OLAF officials were examining Elios—the company then owned by Viktor Orbán’s son-in-law, István Tiborcz—over suspected misuse of EU funds. By that time, a special unit within the IH had already been established specifically for intelligence operations targeting the European Union.

The new cases presented in this article also took place between 2012 and 2018, when the Information Office was overseen by minister János Lázár, who then headed the Prime Minister’s Office and was also the government’s top official responsible for EU affairs. As conflicts between the Orbán government and the European Commission deepened—over issues such as media freedom, the rule of law, judicial independence, sectoral taxes, and the misuse of EU funds—the Prime Minister’s Office, which supervised both the IH and EU-related matters, became increasingly eager to obtain information that could only be accessed from within EU institutions. The goal was to ensure that the Orbán government would receive advance warning of any Brussels measures that might threaten its interests.

“The EU gradually became a target. As government rhetoric turned against Brussels, the EU bureaucracy itself became a focus for the IH,” recalled a former senior Hungarian intelligence officer.

To achieve this, the Hungarian intelligence service cast a wide net. “Every Hungarian citizen working at the Commission who had potential intelligence value was considered a recruitment target and was profiled,” explained a source familiar with the IH’s internal operations. By “profiling,” the source meant that the backgrounds of Hungarian nationals employed at the Commission were thoroughly examined—using state databases, open-source information, and even so-called “background studies.” After this screening, the IH selected which Hungarian officials would be worth approaching through IH officers operating under diplomatic cover in Brussels.

When recruitment succeeded, meetings with the recruited individuals typically took place back in Hungary. “An intelligence officer under diplomatic cover is too visible. The usual method is for personal meetings to happen on home turf with the handler, while the transfer of information occurs through covert technical channels,” the source added.

Some Western European intelligence services began to question the loyalty of Hungary—a country that is formally both a NATO and EU member. “In several former Warsaw Pact countries, traces of the Soviet social, political, and sometimes even intelligence legacy can still be felt,” explained Gerhard Conrad, former head (between 2016 and 2020) of the EU Intelligence and Situation Centre (INTCEN) and a former officer of Germany’s BND, speaking to our German partners. Conrad added that while gathering information through conversation is considered legal, if a diplomat pays for information or asks someone to sign a recruitment paper, it constitutes a violation of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.

A spokesperson for Belgium’s counterintelligence agency, the VSSE, told our Belgian partners that they would “neither confirm nor deny” the exposure of V., the head of Hungary’s Brussels rezidentura.

“We never comment on operational details or individual cases. Doing so would endanger the work of our security services. However, there should be no doubt that any allegations of espionage targeting EU officials or institutions must be taken seriously,” said Maxime Prévot, Belgium’s Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister. He added: “Espionage conducted under diplomatic cover undermines mutual trust between states and the integrity of European institutions. Belgium adheres to one principle: we do not tolerate espionage on our territory. Our services are constantly active, discreet in their operations, and fully committed to protecting our institutions, citizens, and the European organizations based in Brussels.”

During the period covered in this article, the IH officers spying under diplomatic cover were officially employed at Hungary’s Permanent Representation to the EU, headed between 2015 and 2019 by Olivér Várhelyi—who has served as a European Commissioner since 2019. The European Commission’s spokesperson told Direkt36 that there is no indication Várhelyi has breached any of his obligations as Commissioner.

Direkt36 sent detailed questions to the IH, the Prime Minister’s Cabinet Office (which oversees it), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and the Ministry of Construction and Transport (due to János Lázár’s involvement, who is now heading that ministry). None of them responded. Several IH intelligence officers who had taken part in operations targeting EU institutions were also contacted, but they did not reply either.

“We’re both Hungarians, working for the same goal”

Between 2013 and 2014, another Hungarian diplomat, E., who dealt with security matters at the Permanent Representation (AK), also drew the attention of Hungarians working within EU institutions through persistent questioning.

“I met E. at one of the Hungarian Permanent Representation’s events. E. said they were new in their position and in Brussels as well, and asked if I could help them get oriented in the local environment and introduce them to Hungarian colleagues — not only at the European Commission but also at the European Parliament,” recalled another Hungarian official working at the Commission.

The Hungarian Permanent Representation in Brussels – Photo: Kristof Vadino / De Tijd

“We exchanged phone numbers, and after that, E. kept persistently insisting that we meet for coffee. We did meet a few times. At first, I thought they would eventually come up with some kind of job offer. But E. never brought up anything concrete — they just wanted to chat. That’s when I started to get suspicious and realized they might be trying to gather information,” the source added.

In the end, the official did tell E. whom they knew at the Commission and the Parliament, but according to the source, the information was trivial and had no real value.

According to a source familiar with the internal workings of the IH, by mapping out Hungarians working in EU institutions, E. was conducting what is known as “tip gathering.” This meant that E.’s task was to identify which Hungarians in Brussels were working in fields of potential intelligence value—people who might later be useful for providing information or even suitable for recruitment.

Another Hungarian source, who also worked at the European Commission at the time, recounted their own story of how E.’s attempt unfolded and eventually failed. This official worked in a portfolio area that had caused tensions between the Orbán government and the European Commission. When E. found out that this particular Hungarian official was one of those responsible for the issue, E. began probing him with questions.

“That immediately made me suspicious, because I knew that E. had nothing to do with this area—at the time, they were dealing with security matters at the Hungarian Permanent Representation,” the official recalled.

After a few conversations, in early 2014, E. approached the official saying that the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs wanted to consult with him in Budapest. The Commission official agreed, but soon began to encounter a series of odd circumstances. At first, he was told the meeting would take place at the ministry’s Budapest headquarters on Bem Square, with three or four foreign ministry officials present. However, shortly before the scheduled time, he received a phone call: the meeting location had been changed to a café inside a shopping mall in Buda. This was unusual in itself, but the real surprise came when only a single person showed up.

The person, D., immediately offered an explanation during introductions: they claimed that they had transferred from another ministry to the foreign ministry and, due to an internal reorganization, did not yet have a final position — which was why their business card didn’t list any job title. they handed the Commission official one of these title-less foreign ministry cards (which the source also shared with Direkt36).

The conversation quickly became suspicious as well. D., who introduced themselves as a foreign ministry official without a defined role, not only inquired about the Hungarian official’s work at the Commission but also about other people working there. At one point, they suddenly asked the official to obtain and hand over certain non-public internal Commission documents.

“We’re both Hungarians, working for the same goal,” D. said, trying to appeal to patriotic feelings. “I told them a firm no, ended the conversation, and left immediately,” the Commission official recalled.

Several sources familiar with the internal workings of the Hungarian IH confirmed that D. was in fact working for the intelligence. “What happened here was, technically speaking, not an attempt at recruitment, but an attempt at involvement. Involvement means trying to persuade a Hungarian citizen to provide this kind of assistance—for example, by leaking internal documents,” one source explained.

From Hungarian spy to EU counterintelligence officer

Although E. ended their work at the Hungarian Permanent Representation not long afterward, they remained in Brussels. Following their assignment at the Representation, the IH delegated E. to a counterintelligence unit within one of the EU’s security departments as a so-called national expert. Later, the Hungarian Commission official who had refused to leak internal documents accidentally came across E.’s name and new position in an internal Commission directory — and was completely shocked.

The official then contacted their acquaintance, the other Hungarian Commission employee quoted earlier in the article, who E. had previously invited for regular coffee meetings. Together, the two Hungarian Commission officials wrote a letter to the European Commission’s security department, expressing their concerns. The department’s director’s assistant responded and called the official who had been approached by E. and D. During the phone conversation, the Hungarian official gave a detailed account of what had happened.

“I explained that E., acting on behalf of the IH, had previously tried to persuade Commission staffers to cooperate—and now was working in the very EU unit whose job was to counter such operations,” the official recalled.

According to the official, the security department staff member thanked them for the information but said the matter was not considered serious. They added that E. had not worked in an area relevant to Hungarian interests and that their secondment as a national expert was about to end in a few days anyway.

The Commission official who had previously met E. for coffee also remembered that the security department took their report lightly. “But the situation was that someone who had actively participated in the Orbán regime’s intelligence operations suddenly had access to everything within the EU’s internal security system—including the entire HR database. To us, this seemed like an extremely serious vulnerability,” the official said.

“One would assume that an EU member state’s institutions are fundamentally friendly territory. The EU’s system simply isn’t prepared for what happens when a member state starts behaving in a hostile way,” another source working at the European Commission explained. This person had previously shared details with Direkt36 about the IH’s espionage activities against OLAF.

This Commission official also gave an example of how unprepared the EU institutional system is. When an OLAF employee or anyone working for another EU body gains access to classified documents, they must first undergo a national security screening. During this process, the employee’s documents are sent to the intelligence service of their country of citizenship.

“In doing so, the EU practically paints a target on its own people—because the intelligence services of a hostile member state can then see exactly which of their citizens are working on the most sensitive matters within the EU,” the source added.

Olivér Várhelyi’s Embassy

According to recollections, Hungarian espionage activity in Brussels became particularly aggressive during the 2015–2019 period, when Olivér Várhelyi—now an EU Commissioner—served as Hungary’s ambassador to the EU. Known for his absolute loyalty to the Orbán government and his rough working style toward subordinates, Várhelyi was officially also the superior of the IH officers operating under diplomatic cover.

Olivér Várhelyi as EU Commissioner – Source: Várhelyi’s Facebook page

According to several sources familiar with the internal workings of the IH, in the 2010s, among the Hungarian missions operating in Brussels, only the Permanent Representation led by Olivér Várhelyi had intelligence officers stationed there under diplomatic cover—about half a dozen in total. In addition to them, there were also Hungarian ministry officials assigned to the Permanent Representation who, in the meantime, had been persuaded by the IH to secretly cooperate. A source well-acquainted with the IH’s operations added that Várhelyi “visited the IH leadership several times and gave them lectures about EU affairs.”

Although Várhelyi himself did not directly participate in the covert intelligence operations, given his position he was almost certainly aware that espionage activities were taking place at his embassy, and to some extent, which of his diplomats were involved. Moreover, since the IH’s reports were intended for political decision-makers, he himself was one of the end-users of intelligence information.

A Hungarian source working for the European Commission recalled that around 2017–2018, Olivér Várhelyi seemed to know precisely which Hungarian citizens in certain Commission directorates were working on reports critical of the Orbán government. The source was one of those involved in such a document and said that, to their knowledge, Várhelyi personally complained to their superior, claiming that the source was hostile to the Orbán government. However, it is not known whether Várhelyi used IH reports to identify this Hungarian person.

One of the sensitive areas where the IH aggressively sought information was media freedom. According to a Brussels-based source familiar with the field, one of the Hungarian Permanent Representation’s diplomats made significant efforts to find out what kinds of reports and countermeasures the Commission was preparing in response to the Orbán government’s actions against independent media. For example, when various EU bodies and working groups were formed to deal with Hungarian media issues, an IH officer delegated to the Permanent Representation as a diplomat tried to determine whether any of these groups would include Hungarian members and whether their draft documents would contain criticism of the Orbán government.

There were other indications, too, that media-related matters were receiving special attention. “A representative of a major media company complained to me that after a dispute with the Orbán government—in which they sought the Commission’s help—details from one of their closed-door Brussels meetings somehow leaked back to the Hungarian government. The company suspected a Hungarian national working on the Commission’s negotiating team of being behind the leak,” added the Brussels-based source familiar with media affairs.

Issues related to fiscal policy and taxation also came into the IH’s crosshairs. “In early 2016, I was contacted by G., who claimed to have just arrived as a specialist diplomat at the Permanent Representation. By the time they emailed me, it turned out that they had already reached out to several of my other colleagues,” recalled a Hungarian official who also worked for the European Commission at the time. The meeting with G. lasted about an hour and a half, and G. was mainly interested in who was shaping the processes through which the Commission formulates recommendations in certain economic fields.

“What struck me was their complete lack of preparation—it felt like explaining things to a high school student. As they say, they hadn’t even learned their own ‘specialist diplomat cover story’ properly,” said the former Commission official.

By that, they meant that the IH officer lacked the professional knowledge necessary to make their cover story (or “legend,” in intelligence jargon) credible.

Afterward, G. repeatedly tried to set up further meetings, but the official managed to avoid them—and even advised other Hungarian colleagues at the Commission not to meet with G. either. Later, Hungarian journalists in Brussels told the official that it was almost common knowledge that G. was working as an undercover intelligence officer. (A source familiar with the Permanent Representation’s operations at the time also confirmed this to Direkt36.)

Beyond firsthand experiences, Hungarian officials working at the Commission also recounted incidents they had heard about from other Hungarian colleagues. Several Hungarian staff members dealing with economic and financial issues at the European Commission complained that they were being pressured by IH officers serving under diplomatic cover at the Hungarian Permanent Representation. “The intelligence officers didn’t just want information from us—they also tried to influence the Commission’s reports through us. ‘Rewrite this, take that out’—they told us what should or shouldn’t appear in reports and drafts,” recalled one Commission source, who said the IH’s goal was “to make the texts reflect the Orbán government’s worldview, using the Hungarians working at the Commission as tools to achieve that.”

At the Permanent Representation led by Olivér Várhelyi, the later-exposed agent V. officially served as a diplomat responsible for a key economic portfolio, but in reality, they headed the IH’s Brussels residency—effectively acting as the local Hungarian spymaster. According to a source familiar with the IH’s internal operations, this was the first time since the Hungarian regime change of 1989-1990 that the residency was led not by an “overt” officer (one who openly represented the IH before Belgian and EU authorities), but by an undercover operative working in secret—as if operating in a country hostile to Hungary.

Diplomatic cover is the most common disguise for intelligence officers. Even if they are caught engaging in espionage, which is a crime under local law, they remain protected by diplomatic immunity.

Our Belgian partner sent detailed questions about the relationship between Várhelyi and the IH to both the European Commission and Olivér Várhelyi’s cabinet. In response, a Commission spokesperson said that members of the College of Commissioners—including Várhelyi—are personally responsible for ensuring compliance with the relevant treaty provisions and the Commission’s Code of Conduct. “Before assuming their duties, Commissioners also undergo a thorough scrutiny process, including hearings before the European Parliament. The Commission has no indication that Commissioner Várhelyi has breached any of the relevant obligations,” the spokesperson replied.

Training a New Hungarian Elite in Brussels

At one point, V., who led Hungary’s espionage operations in Brussels, outlined a much more ambitious, long-term plan for expanding the Orbán government’s influence to the European Commission official whom they later—unsuccessfully—tried to recruit. “V. told me that we should train a new Hungarian elite in Brussels—a group that could advance the country’s interests in the same way the French or the Germans do,” the official recalled.

V. even mentioned a specific institution: according to them, this new Brussels-based Hungarian elite should be trained through the College of Europe, primarily at its Brugge campus, from where these young Hungarians could later integrate into the Brussels bureaucratic elite.

“They didn’t say it openly, but it was obvious to me that someone like V., coming from the intelligence service, viewed these young Hungarians as potential recruitment targets,” the official said.

“In our conversations, we also discussed how civil society organizations could be used to help Hungary gain greater influence in Brussels,” the official added.

However, V. never got the chance to implement these plans. According to a source familiar with the IH’s internal operations, his downfall was ultimately triggered by a flood of urgent, short-deadline tasks coming from Budapest—from the IH headquarters under the political supervision of János Lázár. Under pressure to deliver quick results, V. and the Brussels residency became increasingly aggressive in expanding their network, while starting to violate basic professional rules—such as maintaining secure contact with recruitment targets or already recruited collaborators.

The Prime Minister’s Office often issued tasks with such tight deadlines that the Brussels IH residency had to respond within a single day. On such occasions, IH officers would sometimes send SMS or other unencrypted messages telling their contacts to check the secure communication channel because a task was urgent. But when an intelligence officer uses insecure channels or fails to take time to ensure that their meetings are not being surveilled, the risk of exposure grows significantly.

As a result, “within a short time, everyone knew that V. was with IH,” recalled a source familiar with the details of how the Hungarian spy network in Brussels was compromised. “Eventually, he ran out of room to maneuver. Even the secret collaborators suffered from it—they believed their cooperation was confidential, until it, too, became compromised,” the source added.

Another source familiar with the details of the collapse of the Hungarian network in Brussels confirmed this account, saying that V. approached Hungarians “recklessly” and almost “in plain sight” for recruitment, which in turn caught the attention of the EU’s own security service.

All the incidents described in this article took place before 2018, and the covert IH officers involved had already been exposed to their targets. As previously reported, in 2018 — after the formation of the fourth Orbán government — the IH headquarters was raided in a major operation by agencies under the supervision of the Ministry of Interior. IH’s entire top leadership was dismissed; János Lázár, who had overseen the foreign intelligence agency, was removed from the government; and the IH was first transferred to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and later to the Prime Minister’s Cabinet Office. Since then, the agency’s leadership has changed multiple times.

The sources spoke about past events but did not disclose what kind of activities, if any, the IH is currently conducting in Brussels.

However, an undercover IH intelligence officer mentioned by one of the Hungarian Commission officials was still listed just a few years ago among the staff of the Hungarian Permanent Representation in Brussels. It is unclear, however, how long this person continued conducting actual intelligence work.

From Blue to Purple Country

Hungary’s intelligence fiasco in Brussels in the 2010s was a particularly sensitive issue for Belgium’s intelligence service (VSSE), even though Hungary’s espionage activities targeted not Belgium itself but the institutions of the European Union. After all, it is also the VSSE’s job to counter such foreign espionage and influence operations directed against EU bodies.

Despite all this, today Belgian intelligence services—including the military intelligence agency (ADIV)—are generally satisfied with their Hungarian partners, including the IH. According to the Belgian daily De Tijd, the Belgians consider the IH “very good,” especially in the field of human intelligence, and other European countries have also reported positive experiences in areas such as counterterrorism cooperation with Hungary. Belgian sources say that the IH mainly focuses on Ukraine and the Balkans, and joint intelligence work is also connected to these regions.

For these reasons, Belgium officially still classifies Hungary as a “blue country,” meaning a cooperative partner—as opposed to “red countries,” such as Russia or China, which have “hostile” status. However, according to information obtained by De Tijd from within the Belgian intelligence community, behind the scenes Hungary is increasingly seen as a “purple country,” a classification that reflects growing doubts about its allied loyalty. The reason for this, however, is not the past espionage scandal in Brussels, but rather the Orbán government’s pro-Kremlin policies.

According to De Tijd, this has had practical consequences: Hungary—along with Slovakia—is no longer among Belgium’s “first-tier” partners in intelligence information sharing. This means that the Hungarians and Slovaks mostly receive only “low-risk” reports from the Belgians—information they would likely have access to anyway through NATO or the EU. Meanwhile, intelligence reports from the Hungarian side concerning Ukraine and Russia are received by the Belgians “with healthy skepticism.”

Sources interviewed by the paper also emphasized that the behavior of Hungarian intelligence officers has visibly changed: while they used to joke about Viktor Orbán in private conversations, they now appear much more loyal. Because of Hungary’s close ties with Russia, Belgian officers jokingly refer to their Hungarian counterparts as “matryoshka dolls”—although so far, no concrete evidence has emerged that Hungarian intelligence services have passed information to Moscow.

At the same time, Hungary continues to strengthen its diplomatic presence in Brussels. According to a Hungarian government decree issued in June this year, eight new diplomats will be posted to the Permanent Representation, with the expenses of one of them covered by the Hungarian counterintelligence agency, the Constitution Protection Office (AH). According to a Hungarian government source, the latter is a newly created overt liaison position delegated by the AH—a role responsible for maintaining contact with other countries’ intelligence representatives posted in Brussels.

The building of the House of Hungary in the Belgian capital – Photo: Kristof Vadino / De Tijd

Belgian intelligence services, however, continue to keep a close eye on Hungarian activities. Especially since, in 2024, the Orbán government opened the House of Hungary in the heart of Brussels—a renovated 18th-century corner building located right next to the Parc de Bruxelles, near both the parliament and the royal palace.

Although the building is officially meant to promote Hungarian music, science, and culture, a source following the matter told De Tijd that local intelligence services often view such institutions as potential risks: “The cultural mission is often just a secondary role.”

Suspicion is further heightened by the fact that the House of Hungary is located at Rue de la Loi 9—directly across from the Belgian Prime Minister’s office at number 16. While no concrete evidence of suspicious activity has been found so far, according to a government source quoted by De Tijd, Belgian services treat the building as a potential risk and are monitoring it accordingly.

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The article was produced in collaboration with Lars Bové (De Tijd), Hannes Munzinger, and Elisa Simantke (Paper Trail Media). Illustration: Péter Somogyi (Szarvas) / Telex