{"id":12206,"date":"2025-06-12T14:09:11","date_gmt":"2025-06-12T12:09:11","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.direkt36.hu\/?p=12206"},"modified":"2025-06-13T10:50:51","modified_gmt":"2025-06-13T08:50:51","slug":"fideszes-propagandista-orosz-titkosszolgalati-kapcsolatai-buktak-ki-egy-nemzetbiztonsagi-ellenorzesen","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.direkt36.hu\/en\/fideszes-propagandista-orosz-titkosszolgalati-kapcsolatai-buktak-ki-egy-nemzetbiztonsagi-ellenorzesen\/","title":{"rendered":"Pro-Orb\u00e1n propagandist\u2019s ties to Russian intelligence exposed during national security screening"},"content":{"rendered":"

In the second half of 2024, a person applying to become a diplomat failed their national security screening. The applicant had enrolled in the diplomatic training program of the Hungarian Diplomatic Academy, which operates under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (KKM), hoping it would lead to a future diplomatic post. However, the screening process flagged a national security risk: one of the applicant\u2019s close acquaintances\u2014a prominent figure in the Hungarian government\u2019s propaganda machinery\u2014has ties to Russian intelligence services.<\/span><\/p>\n

This raised serious concerns, as diplomats regularly gain access to sensitive internal government documents, including classified material. Even more troubling was the nature of the relationship: the propagandist was not just a close personal acquaintance but, according to sources familiar with the matter, had actively helped guide the applicant\u2019s career and tried to secure them a diplomatic position using his own government connections.<\/span><\/p>\n

The pro-Orb\u00e1n propagandist with alleged Russian intelligence ties is a well-known public figure in Hungary: Georg Sp\u00f6ttle, a German-Hungarian who frequently appears in pro-government media as a self-styled \u201csecurity policy expert.\u201d For years, Sp\u00f6ttle has spread disinformation and Kremlin-aligned narratives across government-controlled media platforms\u2014including <\/span>Magyar Nemzet<\/span><\/i>, <\/span>Pesti Sr\u00e1cok<\/span><\/i>, <\/span>Origo<\/span><\/i>, <\/span>Mandiner<\/span><\/i>, <\/span>H\u00edr TV<\/span><\/i>, <\/span>TV2<\/span><\/i>, and Hungary\u2019s state broadcaster.<\/span><\/p>\n

Sp\u00f6ttle has also been a regular guest at the ruling Fidesz party’s campaign events, ran as a <\/span>Fidesz candidate<\/span><\/a> in the 2019 municipal elections in the city of Szentes, and, until a few years ago, worked as a migration expert for an institute of the N\u00e9z\u0151pont Group, which has received government contracts worth <\/span>tens of billions of forints<\/span><\/a>. On his <\/span>LinkedIn profile<\/span><\/a>\u2014last updated in summer 2023\u2014he simply states that he works as a political analyst for the Hungarian government. He also claims to have served in the West German military and police force in his earlier German career.<\/span><\/p>\n

What is not widely known in Hungary is that, in recent years, Georg Sp\u00f6ttle has also become a frequently cited figure in Russian-language Kremlin propaganda. At the same time, he developed personal and professional relationships with individuals working for Russian intelligence and gained access\u2014under the organization of the Russian state\u2014to locations in Russia that would typically require security clearance from Russian intelligence services.<\/span><\/p>\n

Join the Direkt36 supporters\u2019 group and get insight into investigative journalism! Details \u2192<\/a><\/strong><\/h3>\n

Direkt36 uncovered details about Sp\u00f6ttle\u2019s case through sources close to the government, personal acquaintances of Sp\u00f6ttle, former Hungarian intelligence officers, as well as from email correspondence and photographs obtained during the investigation.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The Prime Minister\u2019s Cabinet Office sent a written response, but oddly, they misinterpreted our clear questions\u2014as if we had asked about Sp\u00f6ttle\u2019s own national security screening rather than that of the person applying to the diplomatic program. \u201cNo government body ordered any vetting of Georg Sp\u00f6ttle, and the national security services have not dealt with his screening in any such manner,\u201d the Cabinet Office wrote.<\/span><\/p>\n

After receiving this response, we followed up with a more detailed explanation of the case, explicitly naming the individual who failed the screening. We asked the Cabinet Office to respond accordingly. In a response sent after the article was published, they did not meaningfully answer the detailed questions; instead, they merely stated that \u201cthe contents of the article do not reflect reality,\u201d according to the Cabinet Office.<\/span><\/p>\n

We first contacted Georg Sp\u00f6ttle more than two and a half months ago with a set of written questions. Although he saw the message, he did not respond. We later sent him additional, even more detailed questions\u2014but again, received no answer. However, shortly after we sent our first set of questions to Sp\u00f6ttle, the LinkedIn profile of his close acquaintance who had failed the screening became unavailable. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (KKM) and the Constitution Protection Office (Hungary\u2019s counterintelligence agency), also did not respond to our inquiries.<\/span><\/p>\n

Sp\u00f6ttle was outraged<\/b><\/h2>\n

Under normal circumstances, the details of a national security screening\u2014especially its outcome\u2014are known only to a very limited circle. As such, cases of failure rarely become public knowledge. However, Georg Sp\u00f6ttle was so outraged that his close acquaintance had failed the screening that he tried to mobilize his political and governmental contacts at various levels to challenge the decision. Ironically, this effort ended up drawing wider attention to the case.<\/span><\/p>\n

In the end, no one was willing to help Sp\u00f6ttle. Offended by this, the propagandist <\/span>announced<\/span><\/a> in early 2025 that he was retiring from public life. Yet just weeks later, he reversed course and resumed publishing regularly on various pro-government media platforms as well as on his personal social media accounts.<\/span><\/p>\n

His primary focus has been the war in Ukraine. On the <\/span>Pesti Sr\u00e1cok<\/span><\/i> website, for instance, he hosts a show titled <\/span>GEOrgPOLITIKA<\/span><\/a>, where he regularly comments on war-related news. Internal correspondence obtained by Direkt36 suggests that Sp\u00f6ttle\u2019s earlier Kremlin-friendly analyses closely mirrored briefing materials he received from a Russian military intelligence officer. One of Sp\u00f6ttle\u2019s main contacts at the Russian Embassy in Budapest was military attach\u00e9 Oleg Smirnov, who arranged for Sp\u00f6ttle to attend a Moscow conference in 2024 organized by the Russian Ministry of Defense. In emails related to the trip, Sp\u00f6ttle told Smirnov that he would publish articles and appear on Hungarian TV based on the impressions he gathered during the event.<\/span><\/p>\n

After returning home, Sp\u00f6ttle ramped up his output even further\u2014producing a flood of video and written content on the Russia\u2013Ukraine war from a distinctly pro-Russian viewpoint. He even conducted an <\/span>interview<\/span><\/a> with Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova, which aired on <\/span>Pesti Sr\u00e1cok<\/span><\/i>. He also <\/span>regularly appeared<\/span><\/a> on <\/span>Ultrahang<\/span><\/i>, a YouTube channel aligned with Hungary\u2019s neo-protestant Faith Church congregation, and was <\/span>featured<\/span><\/a> on <\/span>H\u00edr TV<\/span><\/i>, and boasted headlines such as <\/span>\u201cGeorg Sp\u00f6ttle: Ukraine would even conscript transgender soldiers and teenagers.\u201d<\/span><\/i> He also provided commentary for prominent online and print government propaganda mouthpieces <\/span>Origo<\/span><\/i> and <\/span>Magyar Nemzet<\/span><\/i>.<\/span><\/p>\n

The content Sp\u00f6ttle publishes on the war is fully aligned with Kremlin narratives, often emphasizing military strategy and weaponry. In some cases, his commentary goes beyond even the Hungarian government\u2019s own pro-Russian messaging. For instance, in <\/span>Magyar Nemzet<\/span><\/i>, he <\/span>claimed<\/span><\/a> that a Rheinmetall arms factory in western Ukraine could pose a threat to both Transcarpathian Hungarians and Hungary itself, since it might become a target of Russian attacks. This position contradicts the Hungarian government\u2019s stance, as Rheinmetall is a strategic partner not only of Hungary\u2019s military but also of the government-linked tech company 4iG.<\/span><\/p>\n

In an <\/span>Ultrahang<\/span><\/i> podcast <\/span>appearance<\/span><\/a> in fall 2022, Sp\u00f6ttle made his position crystal clear: <\/span><\/p>\n

\u201cI don\u2019t hide my views. In this war, I fully support Russia.\u201d<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

As for Oleg Smirnov, Sp\u00f6ttle\u2019s embassy contact, this article\u2019s author <\/span>previously reported on <\/span>VSquare<\/span><\/i> that Smirnov was a GRU officer<\/span><\/a>\u2014an agent of Russian military intelligence. His presence in Hungary and connections with senior Hungarian defense officials raised eyebrows among NATO allies. Smirnov concluded his posting in Hungary in the fall of 2024.<\/span><\/p>\n

\u201cThe Commando\u2019s Soul\u201d<\/b><\/h2>\n

“Working lunch with Minister P\u00e9ter Szijj\u00e1rt\u00f3. We had plenty to discuss, from the Russia\u2013Ukraine conflict to the Middle East…” \u2014 wrote Georg Sp\u00f6ttle in a since-deleted <\/span>Facebook post<\/span><\/a> on October 18, 2024, alongside photos from his meeting with the Hungarian foreign minister. Szijj\u00e1rt\u00f3 also <\/span>shared<\/span><\/a> images from the meeting, captioned: <\/span>“The world has become a very complicated place; we discussed how each of us sees it…”<\/span><\/i><\/p>\n

\"\"

Szijj\u00e1rt\u00f3 posted about Sp\u00f6ttle on his Facebook page.<\/p><\/div>\n

According to sources familiar with the situation, Szijj\u00e1rt\u00f3 was one of the high-ranking government officials whom Sp\u00f6ttle approached to lobby on behalf of his close acquaintance\u2014trying to ensure their participation in the diplomatic training program despite the national security red flag.<\/span><\/p>\n

The <\/span>training course<\/span><\/a> offered by the Hungarian Diplomatic Academy ran from September 1, 2024, to August 31, 2025. Participants received a net monthly stipend of \u20ac700 (275,000 forints), and the application process required candidates to consent to a national security screening. Sp\u00f6ttle\u2019s acquaintance failed this screening, prompting Sp\u00f6ttle to begin lobbying behind the scenes\u2014an effort even Szijj\u00e1rt\u00f3 ultimately resisted.<\/span><\/p>\n

In theory, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade should be among the most tightly secured institutions from a national security standpoint. Staff are re-screened every five years by the Constitution Protection Office (AH), while the ministry\u2019s own Security, IT and Telecommunications Directorate (BIT\u00c1F) oversees secure communications and the handling of sensitive information. Hungarian foreign intelligence, the Information Office (IH) is responsible for protecting diplomats and embassies abroad.<\/span><\/p>\n

But in the case of Sp\u00f6ttle\u2019s acquaintance, the ministry could hardly ignore the situation\u2014especially given that Sp\u00f6ttle himself had long been on the radar of Hungarian intelligence agencies. His ties extended far beyond Russian intelligence.<\/span><\/p>\n

According to his own account, Sp\u00f6ttle first worked for German military counterintelligence, then later for the federal police. In a 2002 <\/span>Magyar Nemzet<\/span><\/i> interview titled <\/span>\u201cThe Commando\u2019s Soul,\u201d<\/span><\/a> he shared details about his military and police career in Germany, from which he was reportedly discharged on January 1, 2002. By then, he was already being introduced to the Hungarian public as a civilian \u201cterrorism expert\u201d and \u201canalyst.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n

He claimed he was drafted into the West German army at the age of 20, and that, after basic training, he specialized in \u201cspecial weaponry,\u201d including \u201canti-tank systems and various machine guns.\u201d He said his interest in the Middle East and fluency in four languages led military counterintelligence to recruit him. <\/span><\/p>\n

\u201cOf course, I said yes\u2014it seemed like a fascinating mission. I worked there for nearly ten years. After completing the police academy, I joined the Federal Investigation Bureau in 1993,\u201d <\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Sp\u00f6ttle claimed. (A 2006 <\/span>Magyar Nemzet<\/span><\/i> article described him slightly differently\u2014as \u201ca former officer of the German riot police.\u201d)<\/span><\/p>\n

\"\"

Sp\u00f6ttle is popular in Fidesz circles \u2013 Photo: Sp\u00f6ttle\u2019s Facebook page.<\/p><\/div>\n

According to his own version of events, he was initially assigned desk work: \u201cMy task was to screen asylum seekers from Arab countries for potential risks.\u201d Later, while serving with the Bundeswehr, \u201cI spent a lot of time in Lebanon, Iraq, Jordan, and Syria. Our job was surveillance and building contacts.\u201d He also said that in the intelligence field, \u201cthe Israelis command the highest respect,\u201d and that \u201cAmericans are admired for their technology.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n

These comments are especially notable in light of accounts from several former Hungarian intelligence officers and national security experts who recalled an incident in the late 2000s: partner agencies from other countries alerted the Hungarian services that Sp\u00f6ttle had approached both the American and Israeli embassies in a European capital\u2014offering to share his supposed expertise and contacts with their intelligence services. \u201cIn our profession, we call that \u2018flipping over for a belly rub,\u2019\u201d said one former intelligence officer familiar with Sp\u00f6ttle\u2019s case. Another source added, <\/span><\/p>\n

\u201cHe craved recognition. And he always claimed he had no money\u2014he was broke and constantly looking for sponsors.\u201d<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

At the time, the now pro-Kremlin propagandist was reportedly trying to offer his alleged Middle Eastern network to the CIA and Mossad. But both the Americans and Israelis interpreted Sp\u00f6ttle\u2019s approach as a provocation\u2014and notified their Hungarian counterparts. This prompted Hungary\u2019s intelligence services to conduct a deeper investigation into the former German policeman, revealing personal and lifestyle-related factors that led them to conclude he was unfit for any form of cooperation. One former officer said that, within Hungarian national security circles, Sp\u00f6ttle was viewed from the outset as unserious, unprofessional, and prone to conspiracy theories.<\/span><\/p>\n

For example, in the 1990s, Sp\u00f6ttle spoke at UFO-themed events. According to reports from that time, he claimed he had been contacted and examined multiple times by extraterrestrial beings. \u201cFor weeks, I battled fear. At night I would sit on my bed with my service weapon, prepared to kill if the grey creatures came back,\u201d Sp\u00f6ttle once recounted per a quote <\/span>cited by <\/span>444.hu<\/span><\/i><\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

The favorite podcaster of Hungary\u2019s foreign minister<\/b><\/h2>\n

In that <\/span>Magyar Nemzet<\/span><\/i> interview from over two decades ago, Sp\u00f6ttle expressed a starkly negative view of Russian intelligence. \u201cWe thought they were a very vile bunch. They were like a hammer\u2014slamming down hard on anything suspicious. Their operations were bloody, practically signing every action with violence. We were all afraid of the KGB. No one wanted to fall into their hands, and nobody respected them,\u201d he said in 2002.<\/span><\/p>\n

Fast forward 20 years. After Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, Sp\u00f6ttle became an <\/span>open supporter<\/span><\/a> of Russian aggression\u2014voicing this support almost exclusively on government-affiliated, pro-Orb\u00e1n platforms. He had first been picked up and promoted by pro-government propaganda outlets during the 2015 refugee crisis, initially as a \u201cmigration expert.\u201d Over time, his commentary became increasingly focused on the Russia\u2013Ukraine conflict.<\/span><\/p>\n

According to emails seen by Direkt36 and sources familiar with the failed security screening of Sp\u00f6ttle\u2019s acquaintance, Sp\u00f6ttle regularly receives talking points and narrative suggestions from Russian actors, some of whom are connected to Russian intelligence services.<\/span><\/p>\n

On March 6, 2024, for example, Colonel Oleg Smirnov\u2014the Russian military attach\u00e9 at the Budapest embassy and a GRU intelligence officer\u2014sent out two English-language propaganda memos to multiple recipients. These memos, marked with the Russian embassy\u2019s letterhead, were titled <\/span>\u201cOn the Role of Western Countries in the Ukrainian Conflict\u201d<\/span><\/i> and <\/span>\u201cSituation Around Ukraine.\u201d<\/span><\/i><\/p>\n

Using AI tools, we compared the content of these memos to Sp\u00f6ttle\u2019s later public statements, and the analysis revealed a high level of textual and thematic overlap. The memos claimed that the war was provoked by the West; that Ukraine lacked autonomy and was being used as a pawn; that Zelensky was a puppet of the West; and that military aid merely prolonged Ukrainian suffering. Sp\u00f6ttle echoed nearly identical arguments in his own commentary.<\/span><\/p>\n

There was complete alignment between the embassy documents and Sp\u00f6ttle\u2019s assertions that Crimea and Donbas are irrevocably Russian territory, that Ukraine must relinquish them, and that peace could only be achieved through Ukrainian demilitarization and \u201cdenazification.\u201d Both the Russian materials and Sp\u00f6ttle\u2019s commentary also targeted NATO, framing it as a force driving military confrontation and threatening Russia. These narratives go far beyond even the Orb\u00e1n government\u2019s pro-Russian messaging.<\/span><\/p>\n

Later, in an April 10, 2024 English-language email, Sp\u00f6ttle thanked Smirnov for enabling his participation in the Moscow International Security Conference, which was organized by the Russian Ministry of Defense on August 12\u201313, 2024. \u201cI will do my best to give and get new impulses in the field of international politics and security and will publish the results on TV and newspapers in Hungary,\u201d Sp\u00f6ttle wrote.<\/span><\/p>\n

\"\"

Sp\u00f6ttle\u2019s grateful email to the Russian military attach\u00e9<\/p><\/div>\n

Among the documents obtained by Direkt36 is a photo of Sp\u00f6ttle\u2019s badge for the conference, labeled \u201cSpottle Georg, Hungary, Delegate.\u201d On <\/span>both<\/span><\/a> mornings<\/span><\/a> of the event, Sp\u00f6ttle posted videos from his Moscow hotel room. He described meetings at the Russian Foreign Ministry\u2014including with Rodion Mirosnyik, an advisor to Sergey Lavrov who is under EU sanctions\u2014but curiously omitted any mention of the defense ministry\u2019s conference, which Smirnov had helped him attend. According to a source familiar with the failed screening of Sp\u00f6ttle\u2019s acquaintance, he may have deliberately hidden his participation due to the ongoing vetting process.<\/span><\/p>\n

This secrecy stands in contrast to his behavior at the same conference in 2023, when he publicly <\/span>shared<\/span><\/a> his presence and even implied he gave a talk. \u201cNaturally, my topic will be migration\u2014how Hungary is successfully defending itself,\u201d he said in a video at the time. He also praised the event: <\/span><\/p>\n

\u201cYou gain new experiences, ideas, impulses\u2014and, of course, new friends. All of that is very important.\u201d <\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

A photo <\/span>posted<\/span><\/a> that year showed him participating in a small expert discussion group.<\/span><\/p>\n

Another document shows that both Sp\u00f6ttle and his diplomat trainee acquaintance were invited to Smirnov\u2019s farewell reception in September 2024, marking the end of the Russian military attach\u00e9’s diplomatic posting. Direkt36 also obtained a selfie taken on the terrace of the Byblos Lebanese restaurant in Budapest, showing Smirnov and his wife seated with Sp\u00f6ttle.<\/span><\/p>\n

According to our research into Russian online sources and databases, Colonel Oleg Alekseyevich Smirnov received armored unit training, studied at the Moscow State Technical University, and served between 2011 and 2021 as a military attach\u00e9 in Prague before being posted to Hungary. A Czech government source confirmed that Smirnov was considered by their intelligence services to be a GRU officer. He moved from Prague to Budapest in September 2021 and quickly began attending <\/span>events<\/span><\/a> for foreign military attach\u00e9s stationed in Hungary. It\u2019s unclear when he first established contact with Sp\u00f6ttle.<\/span><\/p>\n

What is clear is that, from the early days of the war in February 2022, Sp\u00f6ttle was spreading Kremlin disinformation. On <\/span>Pesti Sr\u00e1cok<\/span><\/i>, he blamed Ukrainian \u201cBanderites\u201d (ultranationalists) for killing civilians. He suggested that the Bucha massacre may have been committed by Ukrainians. He also promoted a conspiracy theory that the United States was operating secret biolabs in Ukraine to develop biological weapons against Russia. In a November 2022 <\/span>Magyar H\u00edrlap <\/span><\/i>interview, Sp\u00f6ttle claimed that some Western military aid sent to Ukraine was being sold off by Ukrainians to criminal groups\u2014including jihadist terrorists. That interview was later translated into Russian and published by a so-called \u201cZ-blogger\u201d (Russian online propagandists supporting the invasion).<\/span><\/p>\n

Since the beginning of the full-scale invasion, Sp\u00f6ttle has become a regular presence not just on fringe outlets like <\/span>Pesti Sr\u00e1cok<\/span><\/i>, but on much larger government-affiliated platforms: <\/span>Magyar Nemzet<\/span><\/i>, state media, TV2\u2019s morning show <\/span>Mokka<\/span><\/i>, <\/span>H\u00edr TV<\/span><\/i>, the <\/span>Ultrahang<\/span><\/i> podcast affiliated with the Faith Church, and <\/span>Origo<\/span><\/i>, where he has his own column. He recently warned <\/span>Origo<\/span><\/i> readers that Ukraine\u2019s EU accession would lead to \u201cUkrainian mafias\u201d involved in prostitution, human trafficking, and drug smuggling appearing in Hungary\u2014weeks before Viktor Orb\u00e1n and the government adopted the same narrative.<\/span><\/p>\n

His content is frequently highlighted by <\/span>Mandiner<\/span><\/i>, a publication owned by the government-funded Mathias Corvinus Collegium (MCC), which sometimes even recaps his appearances in Russian media.<\/span><\/p>\n

An expert in Russia<\/h2>\n

Sp\u00f6ttle also features regularly in Kremlin-backed Russian propaganda. Analyses of these articles show that he is presented as a foreign expert who confirms and amplifies pro-Kremlin narratives for domestic Russian audiences. He is always labeled a <\/span>vengerskiy<\/span><\/i> (Hungarian) political analyst and often comments on not just Hungarian matters but broader international topics. He\u2019s <\/span>weighed in<\/span><\/a> for <\/span>RIA Novosti<\/span><\/i> on the Tucker Carlson\u2013Putin interview, the <\/span>formation<\/span><\/a> of the Patriots for Europe alliance (<\/span>multiple times<\/span><\/a>), and, in February 2024, the <\/span>German elections<\/span><\/a> and <\/span>German\u2013Russian relations<\/span><\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

He also promotes clips from his video interviews on his <\/span>own TikTok account<\/span><\/a>, which has 22,000 followers and 330,000 likes. A European investigative project (with \u00c1tl\u00e1tsz\u00f3\u2019s involvement) published in summer 2024\u2014<\/span>focusing on far-right and pro-Russian disinformation on TikTok<\/span><\/a>\u2014identified Sp\u00f6ttle as one of the main spreaders of such conspiracy content in the Hungarian-language TikTok sphere.<\/span><\/p>\n

Meanwhile, Sp\u00f6ttle has made multiple visits to Russia and even to Russian-occupied Ukrainian territories. He has reported extensively on these trips through Hungarian pro-government media and on his Facebook page, sharing updates from every location. In August 2023, in addition to attending the Moscow conference, he visited occupied Mariupol, <\/span>posting<\/span><\/a> about \u201cNazi Ukrainians attacking civilians\u201d and posing for photos with schoolgirls. On the <\/span>Ultrahang<\/span><\/i> podcast, he <\/span>broadcast<\/span><\/a> a \u201cheart-wrenching report\u201d on Ukraine\u2019s alleged crimes from Donbas.<\/span><\/p>\n

When he returned to Russia in August 2024, Sp\u00f6ttle also visited Chechnya and Grozny, including V.V. Putin Russian Spetsnaz University, where he posed for photos at the shooting range among weapons and armed men. The university was founded in 2013 by Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov in Gudermes under its original name, the International Special Forces Training Center. It was later renamed after Vladimir Putin. In April 2024, Kadyrov appointed his 16-year-old son Adam Kadyrov as chairman of the university\u2019s board. Since the war began, the university has been training volunteers for front-line deployment.<\/span><\/p>\n

Multiple former intelligence officers and sources familiar with Sp\u00f6ttle\u2019s case told Direkt36 that no EU or NATO citizen would be able to access such places during wartime without the active cooperation or approval of the GRU or Russia\u2019s Federal Security Service (FSB).<\/span><\/p>\n

Despite this, Sp\u00f6ttle\u2019s social media posts show that he routinely meets with senior Fidesz politicians and shares selfies from studios and events\u2014including with the likes of <\/span>Viktor Orb\u00e1n himself<\/span><\/a>, from whom (according to <\/span>another post<\/span><\/a>) he once received a birthday card. He\u2019s appeared at countless government-aligned events, from the annual B\u0103ile Tu\u0219nad (Tusn\u00e1df\u00fcrd\u0151) gathering in Romania to CPAC Hungary. At CPAC 2023, he even <\/span>posed<\/span><\/a> for a photo with Defense Minister Krist\u00f3f Szalay-Bobrovniczky, who oversees the Military National Security Service (KNBSZ), the very agency tasked with countering GRU espionage in Hungary.<\/span><\/p>\n

\"\"

Sp\u00f6ttle with Viktor Orb\u00e1n \u2013 Source: Sp\u00f6ttle\u2019s Facebook page<\/p><\/div>\n

And it seems Sp\u00f6ttle\u2019s Russian propaganda in Hungarian media is having an impact. In March 2025, Foreign Minister Szijj\u00e1rt\u00f3 publicly <\/span>stated<\/span><\/a> that while working out, he always listens to podcasts by Georg Sp\u00f6ttle and Gy\u00f6rgy N\u00f3gr\u00e1di (another government-linked \u201csecurity expert\u201d):<\/span><\/p>\n

\u201cI listen to Georg to hear what\u2019s going on in geopolitics\u2014it\u2019s the perfect length for my run. So I\u2019d like to congratulate him on the show. I really, really like it,\u201d Szijj\u00e1rt\u00f3 said.<\/span><\/p>\n

Hungary’s foreign minister made this comment just months after his own ministry\u2019s security screening had flagged Sp\u00f6ttle\u2019s ties to Russian intelligence.<\/span><\/p>\n

Nikita Hava contributed to this article.<\/span><\/i><\/p>\n



<\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Georg Sp\u00f6ttle, a regular presence in pro-Orb\u00e1n media, has come under scrutiny after one of his close acquaintances failed a background check\u2014triggered by concerns over Sp\u00f6ttle\u2019s Russian connections. Information obtained by Direkt36 reveals that Sp\u00f6ttle had a close relationship with an officer from the GRU, Russia\u2019s military intelligence agency.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":23,"featured_media":12207,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"single-telex.php","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[21],"tags":[814,500,315,331],"ppma_author":[549],"aioseo_notices":[],"fimg_url":["https:\/\/www.direkt36.hu\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/06\/spottle_cover.jpeg",1830,1220,false],"authors":[{"term_id":549,"user_id":23,"is_guest":0,"slug":"szabolcs","display_name":"Szabolcs Panyi","avatar_url":{"url":"https:\/\/www.direkt36.hu\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/10\/Panyi-Szabolcs.png","url2x":"https:\/\/www.direkt36.hu\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/10\/Panyi-Szabolcs.png"},"author_category":"","user_url":"","last_name":"Panyi","first_name":"Szabolcs","job_title":"","description":"[:hu]Az ELTE magyar nyelv \u00e9s irodalom szak\u00e1n diplom\u00e1zott. 2013 \u00e9s 2018 k\u00f6z\u00f6tt az Index.hu politika rovat\u00e1nak volt szerkeszt\u0151je \u00e9s \u00fajs\u00e1g\u00edr\u00f3ja. 2017-18-ban Fulbright-\u00f6szt\u00f6nd\u00edjjal az Arizona State University-n tanult oknyomoz\u00f3 \u00fajs\u00e1g\u00edr\u00e1st. 2018 \u0151sz\u00e9n csatlakozott a Direkt36-hoz, ahol f\u0151k\u00e9nt nemzetbiztons\u00e1gi \u00e9s k\u00fclpolitikai vonatkoz\u00e1s\u00fa t\u00f6rt\u00e9neteken dolgozik. Mellette a vars\u00f3i k\u00f6zpont\u00fa VSquare.org visegr\u00e1di r\u00e9gi\u00f3s t\u00e9nyfelt\u00e1r\u00f3 \u00fajs\u00e1g\u00edr\u00f3i platform egyik alap\u00edt\u00f3ja, 2023-t\u00f3l a k\u00f6z\u00e9p-eur\u00f3pai oknyomoz\u00e1sok vezet\u0151je. N\u00e9gyszer nyert Min\u0151s\u00e9gi \u00fajs\u00e1g\u00edr\u00e1s\u00e9rt d\u00edjat \u00e9s szint\u00e9n n\u00e9gyszer Transparency-Soma-d\u00edjat, 2018-ban \u00e9s 2021-ben pedig az Eur\u00f3pai Sajt\u00f3 D\u00edj d\u00f6nt\u0151se volt.[:en]Szabolcs graduated from E\u00f6tv\u00f6s Lor\u00e1nd University where he studied Hungarian language and literature. Between 2013 and 2018, he was an editor and political reporter at Index.hu. At Arizona State University, he studied investigative journalism on a Fulbright Fellowship in 2017-2018. In the fall of 2018, he joined Direkt36, where he mainly works on stories related to national security and foreign policy. Meanwhile, he helped launch VSquare.org, a Warsaw-based cross-border investigative journalism initiative for the Visegr\u00e1d region, where he is currently leading the Central Eastern European investigations. He received the Quality Journalism Award and the Transparency-Soma Award four times each, and he was also shortlisted for the European Press Prize in 2018 and 2021.[:]"}],"tag_names":[{"name":"Georg Sp\u00f6ttle","slug":"georg-spottle"},{"name":"propaganda","slug":"propaganda"},{"name":"P\u00e9ter Szijj\u00e1rt\u00f3","slug":"szijjarto-peter"},{"name":"secret services","slug":"titkosszolgalatok"}],"category_names":[{"name":"The Russian Connection","slug":"orosz-kapcsolatok"}],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.direkt36.hu\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/12206"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.direkt36.hu\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.direkt36.hu\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.direkt36.hu\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/23"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.direkt36.hu\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=12206"}],"version-history":[{"count":9,"href":"https:\/\/www.direkt36.hu\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/12206\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":12231,"href":"https:\/\/www.direkt36.hu\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/12206\/revisions\/12231"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.direkt36.hu\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/12207"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.direkt36.hu\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=12206"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.direkt36.hu\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=12206"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.direkt36.hu\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=12206"},{"taxonomy":"author","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.direkt36.hu\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/ppma_author?post=12206"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}