Brussels is one Europe\u2019s spy capitals\u2014home not only to the EU, but also NATO and numerous other international organizations. Covert intelligence-gathering there is usually the domain of Russian, Chinese, Iranian, or other Middle Eastern services\u2014not of EU member states spying on an alliance and institutional system to which they themselves belong.<\/p>\n
V. and his colleagues\u2019 methods went beyond the limits of what is still considered normal or acceptable in Brussels for an EU member state. Moreover, Hungarian intelligence officers operated recklessly, ignoring basic security precautions. In 2017, V. was exposed\u2014an incident that compromised Hungary\u2019s entire Brussels spy network. As the IH\u2019s rezidentura chief\u2014the head of the network\u2014his fall triggered a domino effect that brought down the entire operation.<\/p>\n
\u201cHe acted irresponsibly, and that drew the EU\u2019s attention. He tried to recruit people in an astonishingly blatant way. Some EU employees even reported him,\u201d said a source familiar with V.\u2019s exposure.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\u201cIt was a serious affair. Practically everyone was burned. The entire network had to be rebuilt from scratch,\u201d recalled a source familiar with the IH\u2019s operations at the time, referring to how Hungarian intelligence had to reestablish its positions in Brussels almost from zero.<\/p>\n
This previously unknown chapter in the deteriorating relationship between the Orb\u00e1n government and EU institutions was pieced together from interviews with more than a dozen insiders familiar with the workings of the Information Office (IH) and Hungary\u2019s Permanent Representation (PR), as well as EU officials whom the IH had tried to recruit.<\/p>\n
Since the EU and Belgian authorities became aware of this past operation by the Hungarian intelligence services years ago, the disclosure of these events does not affect the current activities of the IH.<\/p>\n
The investigation was conducted in collaboration with the German investigative center Paper Trail Media and the Belgian daily De Tijd. They supplemented the investigation with their own German and Belgian sources and are publishing their findings separately in Der Spiegel (Germany)<\/a>, Der Standard (Austria)<\/a>, and De Tijd (Belgium)<\/a>.<\/p>\n
The main targets of the infiltration into EU institutions and the intelligence network\u2019s buildup were Hungarian citizens working in Brussels-based institutions \u2014 foreigners were not targeted in this way by the Hungarian intelligence network operating there.<\/p>\n
When approaching Hungarians, the Information Office (IH) used various means: money, career advancement opportunities, or appeals to patriotic duty. We have no information on how many times this succeeded\u2014in other words, how many Hungarians working at the EU were recruited.<\/p>\n
\u201cOther countries try things like this too. The problem begins when this [espionage against the EU] no longer serves a nation, but a ruling clique\u2014or even a single individual,\u201d said the Hungarian Commission official who had rejected V.\u2019s recruitment attempt. \u201cIt\u2019s the underlying motivation that\u2019s really problematic,\u201d the official added\u2014explaining that he felt the IH\u2019s operations in Brussels no longer served Hungary\u2019s national interest, but rather aimed to strengthen the political and economic power of the Orb\u00e1n government and its associates.<\/p>\n
For example, Direkt36 revealed last autumn that in the mid-2010s, the IH had surveilled and wiretapped investigators from the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) during their mission to Hungary<\/a>. The OLAF officials were examining Elios\u2014the company then owned by Viktor Orb\u00e1n\u2019s son-in-law, Istv\u00e1n Tiborcz\u2014over suspected misuse of EU funds. By that time, a special unit within the IH had already been established specifically for intelligence operations targeting the European Union.<\/p>\n
The new cases presented in this article also took place between 2012 and 2018, when the Information Office was overseen by minister J\u00e1nos L\u00e1z\u00e1r, who then headed the Prime Minister\u2019s Office and was also the government\u2019s top official responsible for EU affairs. As conflicts between the Orb\u00e1n government and the European Commission deepened\u2014over issues such as media freedom, the rule of law, judicial independence, sectoral taxes, and the misuse of EU funds\u2014the Prime Minister\u2019s Office, which supervised both the IH and EU-related matters, became increasingly eager to obtain information that could only be accessed from within EU institutions. The goal was to ensure that the Orb\u00e1n government would receive advance warning of any Brussels measures that might threaten its interests.<\/p>\n
\u201cThe EU gradually became a target. As government rhetoric turned against Brussels, the EU bureaucracy itself became a focus for the IH,\u201d recalled a former senior Hungarian intelligence officer.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
To achieve this, the Hungarian intelligence service cast a wide net. \u201cEvery Hungarian citizen working at the Commission who had potential intelligence value was considered a recruitment target and was profiled,\u201d explained a source familiar with the IH\u2019s internal operations. By \u201cprofiling,\u201d the source meant that the backgrounds of Hungarian nationals employed at the Commission were thoroughly examined\u2014using state databases, open-source information, and even so-called \u201cbackground studies.\u201d After this screening, the IH selected which Hungarian officials would be worth approaching through IH officers operating under diplomatic cover in Brussels.<\/p>\n
When recruitment succeeded, meetings with the recruited individuals typically took place back in Hungary. \u201cAn intelligence officer under diplomatic cover is too visible. The usual method is for personal meetings to happen on home turf with the handler, while the transfer of information occurs through covert technical channels,\u201d the source added.<\/p>\n
Some Western European intelligence services began to question the loyalty of Hungary\u2014a country that is formally both a NATO and EU member. \u201cIn several former Warsaw Pact countries, traces of the Soviet social, political, and sometimes even intelligence legacy can still be felt,\u201d explained Gerhard Conrad, former head (between 2016 and 2020) of the EU Intelligence and Situation Centre (INTCEN) and a former officer of Germany\u2019s BND, speaking to our German partners. Conrad added that while gathering information through conversation is considered legal, if a diplomat pays for information or asks someone to sign a recruitment paper, it constitutes a violation of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.<\/p>\n
A spokesperson for Belgium\u2019s counterintelligence agency, the VSSE, told our Belgian partners that they would \u201cneither confirm nor deny\u201d the exposure of V., the head of Hungary\u2019s Brussels rezidentura.<\/p>\n
\u201cWe never comment on operational details or individual cases. Doing so would endanger the work of our security services. However, there should be no doubt that any allegations of espionage targeting EU officials or institutions must be taken seriously,\u201d said Maxime Pr\u00e9vot, Belgium\u2019s Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister. He added: \u201cEspionage conducted under diplomatic cover undermines mutual trust between states and the integrity of European institutions. Belgium adheres to one principle: we do not tolerate espionage on our territory. Our services are constantly active, discreet in their operations, and fully committed to protecting our institutions, citizens, and the European organizations based in Brussels.\u201d<\/p>\n
During the period covered in this article, the IH officers spying under diplomatic cover were officially employed at Hungary\u2019s Permanent Representation to the EU, headed between 2015 and 2019 by Oliv\u00e9r V\u00e1rhelyi\u2014who has served as a European Commissioner since 2019. The European Commission\u2019s spokesperson told Direkt36 that there is no indication V\u00e1rhelyi has breached any of his obligations as Commissioner.<\/p>\n
Direkt36 sent detailed questions to the IH, the Prime Minister\u2019s Cabinet Office (which oversees it), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and the Ministry of Construction and Transport (due to J\u00e1nos L\u00e1z\u00e1r\u2019s involvement, who is now heading that ministry). None of them responded. Several IH intelligence officers who had taken part in operations targeting EU institutions were also contacted, but they did not reply either.<\/p>\n
\u201cWe\u2019re both Hungarians, working for the same goal\u201d<\/h2>\n
Between 2013 and 2014, another Hungarian diplomat, E., who dealt with security matters at the Permanent Representation (AK), also drew the attention of Hungarians working within EU institutions through persistent questioning.<\/p>\n
\u201cI met E. at one of the Hungarian Permanent Representation\u2019s events. E. said they were new in their position and in Brussels as well, and asked if I could help them get oriented in the local environment and introduce them to Hungarian colleagues \u2014 not only at the European Commission but also at the European Parliament,\u201d recalled another Hungarian official working at the Commission.<\/p>\n
The Hungarian Permanent Representation in Brussels \u2013 Photo: Kristof Vadino \/ De Tijd<\/p><\/div>\n
\u201cWe exchanged phone numbers, and after that, E. kept persistently insisting that we meet for coffee. We did meet a few times. At first, I thought they would eventually come up with some kind of job offer. But E. never brought up anything concrete \u2014 they just wanted to chat. That\u2019s when I started to get suspicious and realized they might be trying to gather information,\u201d the source added.<\/p>\n
In the end, the official did tell E. whom they knew at the Commission and the Parliament, but according to the source, the information was trivial and had no real value.<\/p>\n
According to a source familiar with the internal workings of the IH, by mapping out Hungarians working in EU institutions, E. was conducting what is known as \u201ctip gathering.\u201d This meant that E.\u2019s task was to identify which Hungarians in Brussels were working in fields of potential intelligence value\u2014people who might later be useful for providing information or even suitable for recruitment.<\/p>\n
Another Hungarian source, who also worked at the European Commission at the time, recounted their own story of how E.\u2019s attempt unfolded and eventually failed. This official worked in a portfolio area that had caused tensions between the Orb\u00e1n government and the European Commission. When E. found out that this particular Hungarian official was one of those responsible for the issue, E. began probing him with questions.<\/p>\n
\u201cThat immediately made me suspicious, because I knew that E. had nothing to do with this area\u2014at the time, they were dealing with security matters at the Hungarian Permanent Representation,\u201d the official recalled.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
After a few conversations, in early 2014, E. approached the official saying that the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs wanted to consult with him in Budapest. The Commission official agreed, but soon began to encounter a series of odd circumstances. At first, he was told the meeting would take place at the ministry\u2019s Budapest headquarters on Bem Square, with three or four foreign ministry officials present. However, shortly before the scheduled time, he received a phone call: the meeting location had been changed to a caf\u00e9 inside a shopping mall in Buda. This was unusual in itself, but the real surprise came when only a single person showed up.<\/p>\n
The person, D., immediately offered an explanation during introductions: they claimed that they had transferred from another ministry to the foreign ministry and, due to an internal reorganization, did not yet have a final position \u2014 which was why their business card didn\u2019t list any job title. they handed the Commission official one of these title-less foreign ministry cards (which the source also shared with Direkt36).<\/p>\n
The conversation quickly became suspicious as well. D., who introduced themselves as a foreign ministry official without a defined role, not only inquired about the Hungarian official\u2019s work at the Commission but also about other people working there. At one point, they suddenly asked the official to obtain and hand over certain non-public internal Commission documents.<\/p>\n
\u201cWe\u2019re both Hungarians, working for the same goal,\u201d D. said, trying to appeal to patriotic feelings. \u201cI told them a firm no, ended the conversation, and left immediately,\u201d the Commission official recalled.<\/p>\n
Several sources familiar with the internal workings of the Hungarian IH confirmed that D. was in fact working for the intelligence. \u201cWhat happened here was, technically speaking, not an attempt at recruitment, but an attempt at involvement. Involvement means trying to persuade a Hungarian citizen to provide this kind of assistance\u2014for example, by leaking internal documents,\u201d one source explained.<\/p>\n
From Hungarian spy to EU counterintelligence officer<\/h2>\n
Although E. ended their work at the Hungarian Permanent Representation not long afterward, they remained in Brussels. Following their assignment at the Representation, the IH delegated E. to a counterintelligence unit within one of the EU\u2019s security departments as a so-called national expert. Later, the Hungarian Commission official who had refused to leak internal documents accidentally came across E.\u2019s name and new position in an internal Commission directory \u2014 and was completely shocked.<\/p>\n
The official then contacted their acquaintance, the other Hungarian Commission employee quoted earlier in the article, who E. had previously invited for regular coffee meetings. Together, the two Hungarian Commission officials wrote a letter to the European Commission\u2019s security department, expressing their concerns. The department\u2019s director\u2019s assistant responded and called the official who had been approached by E. and D. During the phone conversation, the Hungarian official gave a detailed account of what had happened.<\/p>\n
\u201cI explained that E., acting on behalf of the IH, had previously tried to persuade Commission staffers to cooperate\u2014and now was working in the very EU unit whose job was to counter such operations,\u201d the official recalled.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
According to the official, the security department staff member thanked them for the information but said the matter was not considered serious. They added that E. had not worked in an area relevant to Hungarian interests and that their secondment as a national expert was about to end in a few days anyway.<\/p>\n
The Commission official who had previously met E. for coffee also remembered that the security department took their report lightly. \u201cBut the situation was that someone who had actively participated in the Orb\u00e1n regime\u2019s intelligence operations suddenly had access to everything within the EU\u2019s internal security system\u2014including the entire HR database. To us, this seemed like an extremely serious vulnerability,\u201d the official said.<\/p>\n
\u201cOne would assume that an EU member state\u2019s institutions are fundamentally friendly territory. The EU\u2019s system simply isn\u2019t prepared for what happens when a member state starts behaving in a hostile way,\u201d another source working at the European Commission explained. This person had previously shared details with Direkt36 about the IH\u2019s espionage activities against OLAF<\/a>.<\/p>\n
This Commission official also gave an example of how unprepared the EU institutional system is. When an OLAF employee or anyone working for another EU body gains access to classified documents, they must first undergo a national security screening. During this process, the employee\u2019s documents are sent to the intelligence service of their country of citizenship.<\/p>\n
\u201cIn doing so, the EU practically paints a target on its own people\u2014because the intelligence services of a hostile member state can then see exactly which of their citizens are working on the most sensitive matters within the EU,\u201d the source added.<\/p>\n
Oliv\u00e9r V\u00e1rhelyi\u2019s Embassy<\/h2>\n
According to recollections, Hungarian espionage activity in Brussels became particularly aggressive during the 2015\u20132019 period, when Oliv\u00e9r V\u00e1rhelyi\u2014now an EU Commissioner\u2014served as Hungary\u2019s ambassador to the EU. Known for his absolute loyalty to the Orb\u00e1n government and his rough working style toward subordinates<\/a>, V\u00e1rhelyi was officially also the superior of the IH officers operating under diplomatic cover.<\/p>\n
Oliv\u00e9r V\u00e1rhelyi as EU Commissioner \u2013 Source: V\u00e1rhelyi\u2019s Facebook page<\/p><\/div>\n
According to several sources familiar with the internal workings of the IH, in the 2010s, among the Hungarian missions operating in Brussels, only the Permanent Representation led by Oliv\u00e9r V\u00e1rhelyi had intelligence officers stationed there under diplomatic cover\u2014about half a dozen in total. In addition to them, there were also Hungarian ministry officials assigned to the Permanent Representation who, in the meantime, had been persuaded by the IH to secretly cooperate. A source well-acquainted with the IH\u2019s operations added that V\u00e1rhelyi \u201cvisited the IH leadership several times and gave them lectures about EU affairs.\u201d<\/p>\n
Although V\u00e1rhelyi himself did not directly participate in the covert intelligence operations, given his position he was almost certainly aware that espionage activities were taking place at his embassy, and to some extent, which of his diplomats were involved. Moreover, since the IH\u2019s reports were intended for political decision-makers, he himself was one of the end-users of intelligence information.<\/p>\n
A Hungarian source working for the European Commission recalled that around 2017\u20132018, Oliv\u00e9r V\u00e1rhelyi seemed to know precisely which Hungarian citizens in certain Commission directorates were working on reports critical of the Orb\u00e1n government. The source was one of those involved in such a document and said that, to their knowledge, V\u00e1rhelyi personally complained to their superior, claiming that the source was hostile to the Orb\u00e1n government. However, it is not known whether V\u00e1rhelyi used IH reports to identify this Hungarian person.<\/p>\n
One of the sensitive areas where the IH aggressively sought information was media freedom. According to a Brussels-based source familiar with the field, one of the Hungarian Permanent Representation\u2019s diplomats made significant efforts to find out what kinds of reports and countermeasures the Commission was preparing in response to the Orb\u00e1n government\u2019s actions against independent media. For example, when various EU bodies and working groups were formed to deal with Hungarian media issues, an IH officer delegated to the Permanent Representation as a diplomat tried to determine whether any of these groups would include Hungarian members and whether their draft documents would contain criticism of the Orb\u00e1n government.<\/p>\n
There were other indications, too, that media-related matters were receiving special attention. \u201cA representative of a major media company complained to me that after a dispute with the Orb\u00e1n government\u2014in which they sought the Commission\u2019s help\u2014details from one of their closed-door Brussels meetings somehow leaked back to the Hungarian government. The company suspected a Hungarian national working on the Commission\u2019s negotiating team of being behind the leak,\u201d added the Brussels-based source familiar with media affairs.<\/p>\n
Issues related to fiscal policy and taxation also came into the IH\u2019s crosshairs. \u201cIn early 2016, I was contacted by G., who claimed to have just arrived as a specialist diplomat at the Permanent Representation. By the time they emailed me, it turned out that they had already reached out to several of my other colleagues,\u201d recalled a Hungarian official who also worked for the European Commission at the time. The meeting with G. lasted about an hour and a half, and G. was mainly interested in who was shaping the processes through which the Commission formulates recommendations in certain economic fields.<\/p>\n
\u201cWhat struck me was their complete lack of preparation\u2014it felt like explaining things to a high school student. As they say, they hadn\u2019t even learned their own \u2018specialist diplomat cover story\u2019 properly,\u201d said the former Commission official.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
By that, they meant that the IH officer lacked the professional knowledge necessary to make their cover story (or \u201clegend,\u201d in intelligence jargon) credible.<\/p>\n
Afterward, G. repeatedly tried to set up further meetings, but the official managed to avoid them\u2014and even advised other Hungarian colleagues at the Commission not to meet with G. either. Later, Hungarian journalists in Brussels told the official that it was almost common knowledge that G. was working as an undercover intelligence officer. (A source familiar with the Permanent Representation\u2019s operations at the time also confirmed this to Direkt36.)<\/p>\n
Beyond firsthand experiences, Hungarian officials working at the Commission also recounted incidents they had heard about from other Hungarian colleagues. Several Hungarian staff members dealing with economic and financial issues at the European Commission complained that they were being pressured by IH officers serving under diplomatic cover at the Hungarian Permanent Representation. \u201cThe intelligence officers didn\u2019t just want information from us\u2014they also tried to influence the Commission\u2019s reports through us. \u2018Rewrite this, take that out\u2019\u2014they told us what should or shouldn\u2019t appear in reports and drafts,\u201d recalled one Commission source, who said the IH\u2019s goal was \u201cto make the texts reflect the Orb\u00e1n government\u2019s worldview, using the Hungarians working at the Commission as tools to achieve that.\u201d<\/p>\n
At the Permanent Representation led by Oliv\u00e9r V\u00e1rhelyi, the later-exposed agent V. officially served as a diplomat responsible for a key economic portfolio, but in reality, they headed the IH\u2019s Brussels residency\u2014effectively acting as the local Hungarian spymaster. According to a source familiar with the IH\u2019s internal operations, this was the first time since the Hungarian regime change of 1989-1990 that the residency was led not by an \u201covert\u201d officer (one who openly represented the IH before Belgian and EU authorities), but by an undercover operative working in secret\u2014as if operating in a country hostile to Hungary.<\/p>\n
Diplomatic cover is the most common disguise for intelligence officers. Even if they are caught engaging in espionage, which is a crime under local law, they remain protected by diplomatic immunity.<\/p>\n
Our Belgian partner sent detailed questions about the relationship between V\u00e1rhelyi and the IH to both the European Commission and Oliv\u00e9r V\u00e1rhelyi\u2019s cabinet. In response, a Commission spokesperson said that members of the College of Commissioners\u2014including V\u00e1rhelyi\u2014are personally responsible for ensuring compliance with the relevant treaty provisions and the Commission\u2019s Code of Conduct. \u201cBefore assuming their duties, Commissioners also undergo a thorough scrutiny process, including hearings before the European Parliament. The Commission has no indication that Commissioner V\u00e1rhelyi has breached any of the relevant obligations,\u201d the spokesperson replied.<\/p>\n
Training a New Hungarian Elite in Brussels<\/h2>\n
At one point, V., who led Hungary\u2019s espionage operations in Brussels, outlined a much more ambitious, long-term plan for expanding the Orb\u00e1n government\u2019s influence to the European Commission official whom they later\u2014unsuccessfully\u2014tried to recruit. \u201cV. told me that we should train a new Hungarian elite in Brussels\u2014a group that could advance the country\u2019s interests in the same way the French or the Germans do,\u201d the official recalled.<\/p>\n
V. even mentioned a specific institution: according to them, this new Brussels-based Hungarian elite should be trained through the College of Europe, primarily at its Brugge campus, from where these young Hungarians could later integrate into the Brussels bureaucratic elite.<\/p>\n
\u201cThey didn\u2019t say it openly, but it was obvious to me that someone like V., coming from the intelligence service, viewed these young Hungarians as potential recruitment targets,\u201d the official said.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\u201cIn our conversations, we also discussed how civil society organizations could be used to help Hungary gain greater influence in Brussels,\u201d the official added.<\/p>\n
However, V. never got the chance to implement these plans. According to a source familiar with the IH\u2019s internal operations, his downfall was ultimately triggered by a flood of urgent, short-deadline tasks coming from Budapest\u2014from the IH headquarters under the political supervision of J\u00e1nos L\u00e1z\u00e1r. Under pressure to deliver quick results, V. and the Brussels residency became increasingly aggressive in expanding their network, while starting to violate basic professional rules\u2014such as maintaining secure contact with recruitment targets or already recruited collaborators.<\/p>\n
The Prime Minister\u2019s Office often issued tasks with such tight deadlines that the Brussels IH residency had to respond within a single day. On such occasions, IH officers would sometimes send SMS or other unencrypted messages telling their contacts to check the secure communication channel because a task was urgent. But when an intelligence officer uses insecure channels or fails to take time to ensure that their meetings are not being surveilled, the risk of exposure grows significantly.<\/p>\n
As a result, \u201cwithin a short time, everyone knew that V. was with IH,\u201d recalled a source familiar with the details of how the Hungarian spy network in Brussels was compromised. \u201cEventually, he ran out of room to maneuver. Even the secret collaborators suffered from it\u2014they believed their cooperation was confidential, until it, too, became compromised,\u201d the source added.<\/p>\n
Another source familiar with the details of the collapse of the Hungarian network in Brussels confirmed this account, saying that V. approached Hungarians \u201crecklessly\u201d and almost \u201cin plain sight\u201d for recruitment, which in turn caught the attention of the EU\u2019s own security service.<\/p>\n
All the incidents described in this article took place before 2018, and the covert IH officers involved had already been exposed to their targets. As previously reported, in 2018 \u2014 after the formation of the fourth Orb\u00e1n government \u2014 the IH headquarters was raided in a major operation by agencies under the supervision of the Ministry of Interior. IH’s entire top leadership was dismissed; J\u00e1nos L\u00e1z\u00e1r, who had overseen the foreign intelligence agency, was removed from the government; and the IH was first transferred to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and later to the Prime Minister\u2019s Cabinet Office. Since then, the agency\u2019s leadership has changed multiple times.<\/p>\n
The sources spoke about past events but did not disclose what kind of activities, if any, the IH is currently conducting in Brussels.<\/p>\n
However, an undercover IH intelligence officer mentioned by one of the Hungarian Commission officials was still listed just a few years ago among the staff of the Hungarian Permanent Representation in Brussels. It is unclear, however, how long this person continued conducting actual intelligence work.<\/p>\n
From Blue to Purple Country<\/h2>\n
Hungary\u2019s intelligence fiasco in Brussels in the 2010s was a particularly sensitive issue for Belgium\u2019s intelligence service (VSSE), even though Hungary\u2019s espionage activities targeted not Belgium itself but the institutions of the European Union. After all, it is also the VSSE\u2019s job to counter such foreign espionage and influence operations directed against EU bodies.<\/p>\n
Despite all this, today Belgian intelligence services\u2014including the military intelligence agency (ADIV)\u2014are generally satisfied with their Hungarian partners, including the IH. According to the Belgian daily De Tijd, the Belgians consider the IH \u201cvery good,\u201d especially in the field of human intelligence, and other European countries have also reported positive experiences in areas such as counterterrorism cooperation with Hungary. Belgian sources say that the IH mainly focuses on Ukraine and the Balkans, and joint intelligence work is also connected to these regions.<\/p>\n
For these reasons, Belgium officially still classifies Hungary as a \u201cblue country,\u201d meaning a cooperative partner\u2014as opposed to \u201cred countries,\u201d such as Russia or China, which have \u201chostile\u201d status. However, according to information obtained by De Tijd from within the Belgian intelligence community, behind the scenes Hungary is increasingly seen as a \u201cpurple country,\u201d a classification that reflects growing doubts about its allied loyalty. The reason for this, however, is not the past espionage scandal in Brussels, but rather the Orb\u00e1n government\u2019s pro-Kremlin policies.<\/p>\n
According to De Tijd, this has had practical consequences: Hungary\u2014along with Slovakia\u2014is no longer among Belgium\u2019s \u201cfirst-tier\u201d partners in intelligence information sharing. This means that the Hungarians and Slovaks mostly receive only \u201clow-risk\u201d reports from the Belgians\u2014information they would likely have access to anyway through NATO or the EU. Meanwhile, intelligence reports from the Hungarian side concerning Ukraine and Russia are received by the Belgians \u201cwith healthy skepticism.\u201d<\/p>\n
Sources interviewed by the paper also emphasized that the behavior of Hungarian intelligence officers has visibly changed: while they used to joke about Viktor Orb\u00e1n in private conversations, they now appear much more loyal. Because of Hungary\u2019s close ties with Russia, Belgian officers jokingly refer to their Hungarian counterparts as \u201cmatryoshka dolls\u201d\u2014although so far, no concrete evidence has emerged that Hungarian intelligence services have passed information to Moscow.<\/p>\n
At the same time, Hungary continues to strengthen its diplomatic presence in Brussels. According to a Hungarian government decree<\/a> issued in June this year, eight new diplomats will be posted to the Permanent Representation, with the expenses of one of them covered by the Hungarian counterintelligence agency, the Constitution Protection Office (AH). According to a Hungarian government source, the latter is a newly created overt liaison position delegated by the AH\u2014a role responsible for maintaining contact with other countries\u2019 intelligence representatives posted in Brussels.<\/p>\n
The building of the House of Hungary in the Belgian capital \u2013 Photo: Kristof Vadino \/ De Tijd<\/p><\/div>\n
Belgian intelligence services, however, continue to keep a close eye on Hungarian activities. Especially since, in 2024, the Orb\u00e1n government opened the House of Hungary in the heart of Brussels\u2014a renovated 18th-century corner building located right next to the Parc de Bruxelles, near both the parliament and the royal palace.<\/p>\n
Although the building is officially meant to promote Hungarian music, science, and culture, a source following the matter told De Tijd that local intelligence services often view such institutions as potential risks: \u201cThe cultural mission is often just a secondary role.\u201d<\/p>\n
Suspicion is further heightened by the fact that the House of Hungary is located at Rue de la Loi 9\u2014directly across from the Belgian Prime Minister\u2019s office at number 16. While no concrete evidence of suspicious activity has been found so far, according to a government source quoted by De Tijd, Belgian services treat the building as a potential risk and are monitoring it accordingly.<\/p>\n
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The article was produced in collaboration with Lars Bov\u00e9 (De Tijd), Hannes Munzinger, and Elisa Simantke (Paper Trail Media). Illustration: P\u00e9ter Somogyi (Szarvas) \/ Telex<\/em><\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
In the 2010s, Hungarian intelligence began spying in Brussels against the EU and tried to recruit Hungarians working in EU institutions for this purpose. However, Hungarian intelligence carried it out so blatantly and clumsily that they were exposed, and their network collapsed \u2014 as uncovered by Direkt36 in cooperation with Belgian and German partners.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":23,"featured_media":12463,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"single-telex.php","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[863],"tags":[100,330,331],"ppma_author":[549],"aioseo_notices":[],"fimg_url":["https:\/\/www.direkt36.hu\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/10\/szarvas-eu-kemkedes.jpeg",1830,1220,false],"authors":[{"term_id":549,"user_id":23,"is_guest":0,"slug":"szabolcs","display_name":"Szabolcs Panyi","avatar_url":{"url":"https:\/\/www.direkt36.hu\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/10\/Panyi-Szabolcs.png","url2x":"https:\/\/www.direkt36.hu\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/10\/Panyi-Szabolcs.png"},"author_category":"","user_url":"","last_name":"Panyi","first_name":"Szabolcs","job_title":"","description":"[:hu]Az ELTE magyar nyelv \u00e9s irodalom szak\u00e1n diplom\u00e1zott. 2013 \u00e9s 2018 k\u00f6z\u00f6tt az Index.hu politika rovat\u00e1nak volt szerkeszt\u0151je \u00e9s \u00fajs\u00e1g\u00edr\u00f3ja. 2017-18-ban Fulbright-\u00f6szt\u00f6nd\u00edjjal az Arizona State University-n tanult oknyomoz\u00f3 \u00fajs\u00e1g\u00edr\u00e1st. 2018 \u0151sz\u00e9n csatlakozott a Direkt36-hoz, ahol f\u0151k\u00e9nt nemzetbiztons\u00e1gi \u00e9s k\u00fclpolitikai vonatkoz\u00e1s\u00fa t\u00f6rt\u00e9neteken dolgozik. Mellette a vars\u00f3i k\u00f6zpont\u00fa VSquare.org visegr\u00e1di r\u00e9gi\u00f3s t\u00e9nyfelt\u00e1r\u00f3 \u00fajs\u00e1g\u00edr\u00f3i platform egyik alap\u00edt\u00f3ja, 2023-t\u00f3l a k\u00f6z\u00e9p-eur\u00f3pai oknyomoz\u00e1sok vezet\u0151je. N\u00e9gyszer nyert Min\u0151s\u00e9gi \u00fajs\u00e1g\u00edr\u00e1s\u00e9rt d\u00edjat \u00e9s szint\u00e9n n\u00e9gyszer Transparency-Soma-d\u00edjat, 2018-ban \u00e9s 2021-ben pedig az Eur\u00f3pai Sajt\u00f3 D\u00edj d\u00f6nt\u0151se volt.[:en]Szabolcs graduated from E\u00f6tv\u00f6s Lor\u00e1nd University where he studied Hungarian language and literature. Between 2013 and 2018, he was an editor and political reporter at Index.hu. At Arizona State University, he studied investigative journalism on a Fulbright Fellowship in 2017-2018. In the fall of 2018, he joined Direkt36, where he mainly works on stories related to national security and foreign policy. Meanwhile, he helped launch VSquare.org, a Warsaw-based cross-border investigative journalism initiative for the Visegr\u00e1d region, where he is currently leading the Central Eastern European investigations. He received the Quality Journalism Award and the Transparency-Soma Award four times each, and he was also shortlisted for the European Press Prize in 2018 and 2021.[:]"}],"tag_names":[{"name":"EU","slug":"eu"},{"name":"secret service","slug":"titkosszolgalat"},{"name":"secret services","slug":"titkosszolgalatok"}],"category_names":[{"name":"Orb\u00e1n Abroad","slug":"orban-kulfoldon"}],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.direkt36.hu\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/12462"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.direkt36.hu\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.direkt36.hu\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.direkt36.hu\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/23"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.direkt36.hu\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=12462"}],"version-history":[{"count":17,"href":"https:\/\/www.direkt36.hu\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/12462\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":12491,"href":"https:\/\/www.direkt36.hu\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/12462\/revisions\/12491"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.direkt36.hu\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/12463"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.direkt36.hu\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=12462"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.direkt36.hu\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=12462"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.direkt36.hu\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=12462"},{"taxonomy":"author","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.direkt36.hu\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/ppma_author?post=12462"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}
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